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I.

INTRODUCTION

The most comprehensive description of the West German civil litigation system to appear in United States law journals, a much-admired, practice-oriented work by two United States law professors and
a Hamburg judge, was published twenty-five years ago.' At that moment, a commission of experts, appointed in 1955 by the Federal Ministry of Justice and called the Commission to Prepare a Reform of Civil
Justice, was already deep into a thorough reexamination of the entire
West German system. The stimuli for this reexamination were the
eternal devils of judicial procedure everywhere: technicality, inaccessibility, and above all, delay and cost. In 1961, the Preparatory Commission made extensive recommendations for change in its final report. In
1964, the Ministry appointed the Kommission far Zivilprozessrecht

(Commission for Civil Procedure Law), which was charged with translating these recommendations into specific legislative proposals.2 The
* Research for this paper was done during a sabbatical year in residence at the Max
Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany. 1980-81,
made possible by a Fulbright-Hays Research grant. I wish to thank both institutions for
their generous support. Professor Hein Katz and Dr. Hans-Dtlrgen Putt Farker of The
Institute and Professor Albrecht Zeuner of The University of Hamburg were of great help
on this project. While in Germany I was able to talk with lawyers and judges. observe trials
and examine files of actual cases, both in Hamburg and in Freiburg. Special gratitude for
their assistance in this respect is due to Presiding Judges Horst-Dieter Hensen,
Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, Jtargen Meyer, Landgericht Hamburg, and Klaus Hertel.
Landgericht Freiburg. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations herein were made by the
author.
1. Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure, 71 HARV. L.
REv. 1193 (1958). See also Kaplan, Civil Procedur,,"Reflections on the Comparison of .Systems, 9 BUFFALO L. Rev. 409 (1960) (a masterful summation).
2. See BERICHT DER KOMMISSION FOR DAS ZIVILPROZESSRECUr (Bonn 1977) [hereinafter cited as BERICHT DER KoMMISSION 19771. Commissions were also formed at the same
time on Court Structure and Legal Officers and on Non-Contentious Procedures. The first
of these submitted its final report in 1975. Id at 3.
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proposals came in several stages, and by the time the Commission for
Civil Procedure filed its final report in 1977, the legislature had passed
most of the Commission's recommendations. With the passage in 1980
of statutes revising and considerably expanding legal assistance to the
poor, 3 the legislative phase of this reexamination appears to have
reached a conclusion, and lawyers and judges have some reason to
hope for time to digest the new rules.
The reforms actually adopted, of course, do not satisfy the most
ambitious reformers, and in several respects even the cautious proposals of the Commissions were further compromised in passage.
Whether the reforms represent fundamental change in the system so
deftly portrayed by Kaplan, von Mehren and Schaefer4 may therefore
be doubted. Moreover, those changes which affect fundamental relationships within the system-between lawyers, parties, and judges, between single judge and panel, between written and oral elements of the
process, between thorough examination of the evidence and acceleration of trial schedule-are phrased in terms of options which may not
be fully utilized or of evaluations which may be colored by traditional
reluctance to decide cases on technicalities. In short, practice may further weaken reforms which are already somewhat conservative on paper. Indeed, a major theme of the history of German civil procedure,
which is echoed by experience in the United States, has been the inability of legislatures to control the habits of judges by the reformation of
formal rules. This theme nourishes much skepticism about the efficacy
of the current reform movement.
Nevertheless, an updating in the form of a report on the reform
movement is in order for a number of reasons. First, virtually every
phase of the civil litigation system was subjected to critical review both
in the Commissions and in the literature, and the extent to which fundamental features of the system have been called into question is of
general interest. Second, most phases of the civil lawsuit have undergone amendment at least in detail, so that in many respects the twenty
year old picture is no longer accurate. Third and most importantly
from the comparatist's point of view, the impetus for the reform movement was largely a condition shared by the United States and in various degrees by most industrialized societies: the so-called "law
explosion," which threatens to drown the courts in a sea of litigation.
3. Prozesskostenhilfegesetz, 1980 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI 1I 677 (W. Ger.) (Law on
Assistance for Litigation Costs); Beratungshilfegesetz, 1980 BGB1 I 689 (W. Ger,) (Law on
Legal Advice and Representation for Citizens with Low Income).
4. See Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 1.
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An examination of how the German system has approached this common problem and with what success is useful in evaluating reform proposals in the United States.
This Article will attempt such an updating. Beginning with a brief
sketch of the history of the present Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung or ZPO), the heart of the Article will be an analysis of
the reforms of the 1970's in light of perceived needs. Finally, some
points of contrast with United States civil procedure will be
highlighted.
IL.

THE 1877 ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG AND ITS
REFORM

For the proceduralist familiar with the United States process of
reform (the Field Code of 1848), reform of the reform (Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure of 1938), and still further calls for adaptation to new
social and institutional circumstances, it can come as no surprise that
the German ZPO of 1877-itself a significant reform as well as a national uniformization-has been subject to demands for change from
its inception.
The ZPO's principal predecessor, the so-called common-law procedure, was characterized by almost exclusively written, secret, and
often interminable proceedings.6 Reaction against this system led the
nineteenth century reformers to adopt orality and immediacy in communications between the parties and the court, and party autonomy in
driving the lawsuit toward conclusion, as the most important guiding
principles of the new code. Orality meant that the normal and preferred (though not the only)7 means of party communication with the
court was an oral statement in open court.' Immediacy meant that the
judge or judges making the final decision should also hear all the evidence and argument.9 Party autonomy meant that every step of the
5. Zivilprozessordnung (Ordinance of Civil Procedure) of January 30. 1877. Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBI) 83 (W. Ger.).
6. On this system in Europe see generally CappellettL Social and Political Aspecis of
Civil Procedure:Reforms and Trends in Western andEastern Europe, 69 MIcI. L REv. 847
(1971).
7. For the point that even the reformers of 1877 had no thought of excluding written
pleading altogether, see Bettermann, Hundert Jahre Zivilpro:essordnung-DasSchicksal
einer liberalen Kodofcation, 91 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ZIVILPROZESS [ZZP] 365. 374 (1978).
8. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 416-18.
9. On these interrelated concepts generally, see Bettermann, supra note 7. at 369: M.
CAPPELLETTI, PROCEDURE ORALE ET PROCEDURE ECRITE (1970): Homburger. Functions of
Oraliy in Austrian and American Civil Procedure, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 9 (1970).
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lawsuit was essentially subject to the control of the parties. The court
could consider only those factual propositions asserted by one or more
of the parties, could base its decision only on evidence presented to it
by the parties, and had to yield even its hearing schedule to party
agreement. Moreover, the parties were responsible for service on each
other of all important procedural documents, including judgments.' 0
Added to these expressions of nineteenth century liberalism was
the more traditional principle of collegiality, which generally required
that cases be heard by a panel of three judges in the Landgerichle
(courts of general original jurisdiction). Finally, as a logical though not
inevitable corollary of the principle of orality, the ZPO adopted the
concept of the continuous hearing (Einheit der mfindlichen Verhandung), one consequence of which was that new material could be introduced at any time up to the close of the hearing at which judgment
is rendered." Among the practical results hoped for in this general shift
to openness and party control was greater efficiency in the handling of
lawsuits.
Within a few decades of the ZPO's adoption, it came to be viewed
by many lawyers as especially hospitable to delay because there was
little or no incentive for-the parties to prepare thoroughly for any one
hearing or to make pleadings complete. The pleadings could always be
supplemented orally, hearings could always be postponed, factual issues could be retried on appeal, and so on.12 This picture of courts as
helpless to move cases along, however inaccurate it may have been for
any given court or class of cases, has dominated the thinking of reform10. See Bettermann, supra note 7, at 385f; J. DAMRAU, DIE ENTWICKLUNO EINZELNI:R
PROZESSMAXIMEN SEIT DER REICHSZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG VON 1877 § 10 (1975).
11. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] § 251 (1877), § 278 (1898); Kaplan, supra note 1, at 418;
Bettermann, supra note 7, at 38 1.
What then is the grand discriminant, the watershed feature, so to speak, which
shows the English and American systems to be consanguine, and sets them apart
from the German, the Italian, and others in the civil-law family? I think it is the
single-episode trial as contrasted with continuous or staggered proof-taking. This
characteristic must greatly affect the anterior proceedings that culminate in trial. It
enhances the combative nature of the process. It determines in considerable part
the attitudes and characters of lawyers and judges.
Kaplan, An American Lawyer in the Queen's Courts: Impressions ofEnglish Civil Procedure,
69 MICH. L. REV. 821, 841 (1971).

The other aspect of the concept of continuous hearing was that material presented at
one stage of the lawsuit need not be repeated in order to be considered at a later stage.
12. See, e.g., J. DAMRAU, supra note 10, §§ 10, 14; E. FucHs, Jaihrliche Vergeudung von
Hunderten von Justizkraftfahren, in RECHT UND WIRTSCHAFT 88 (1920), reprinted in Ill
GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN (1975).
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ers ever since.' 3 Major reforms were adopted in 1909 and 1924, and
lesser ones in 1933 and 1943, all designed principally to tighten judicial
control over the course of the lawsuit and to promote efficiency.14 The
1909 reform established the principle of court control over fixing dates
and service of important procedural documents in theAmrsgerichle (local courts handling smaller cases). 5 In 1924 the power of the parties in
proceedings before the Landgerichte to extend deadlines, cancel hearing dates, and suspend the proceedings was eliminated.' 6 In addition,
the institution of the single judge as preparer of the final hearing was
introduced along with various devices for precluding delayed introduction of new issues or materials. 7 The 1933 reform imposed a general
duty of truthfulness and completeness on the parties, 8 and the rules of
evidence were substantially liberalized in favor of free judicial evaluation of the evidence.' 9 In 1943, the principle of court control in the
Landgerichte was finally extended to include service of most important
judicial documents. 0
At the beginning of the present reform period, then, the German
system could be called "trial by colloquy."'" It was characterized by
judicial control over the course of the lawsuit, by the absence of division of the lawsuit into discrete stages, by informality of pleadings, and
by "episodic"' proof-taking. The proof-taking was often spread over
several hearings, during which the judge took the leading role in questioning witnesses, and at which restrictive evidentiary rules were at an
absolute minimum. While the 1924 reforms provided the courts with
various means to accelerate the processing of cases, they remained
largely unexploited, and the length and expense of the typical lawsuit
again provided the main stimulus for further reform. In general, the
13. A leading scholar noted in 1921 that Germany had vacillated back and forth almost
cyclically between continuous hearings on the one hand and strictly demarcated, preclusion
enforced stages on the other, each shift justified by the need to speed up litigation. F. STEIN,
GRURDRISS DES ZIVILPROZESSRECHrs 46 (1921).

14. The leading foreign model for these reforms was the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure of 1895, drafted by Franz Klein, whose many writings were quite as much a part of the
German as of the Austrian literature. On the Austrian system, see HomburgerMilpra note 9,
at 19.
15. Amtsgerichtsnovelle, 1909 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 475 (W. Ger.).
16. Emmingernovelle, 1924 RGBI 1 135 (W. Ger.) (named after the justice minister
who drafted it).
17. Id
18. ZPO § 138 (1933).
19. 1933 RGBI I 821 (W. Ger.).
20. 1943 RGBI 1 7 (W. Ger.) (Fourth Simplification Ordinance).
21. Homburger, supra note 9, at 24.
22. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 420.
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trend of the changes which have been adopted piecemeal since the
Commission for Civil Procedure Law began its work has been both to
strengthen the role of the judge and to inject greater formality into the
system.
After World War II, the first development to be put into practice
came from neither the Commissions nor the legislature, but from one
civil chamber of the Landgericht in Stuttgart and its presiding judge, in
the form of the so-called "Stuttgart Model."23 This experiment in restructuring the lawsuit was inconsistent in some ways with the ZPO,
but spread to a number of other districts and is still in use today. It
utilizes: (1) a written, tightly scheduled pretrial procedure; (2) a thorough pretrial conference at which the court is required to give a preliminary indication of its position on contested legal issues; and (3) if
necessary, a three-stage evidentiary hearing comprised of party examination, witness examination, and final argument during which the
court twice formulates proposed resolutions before finally rendering a
binding judgment.24 The experiment began in 1967, and evidence of its
success in the form of high settlement rates and shorter average trial
time substantially influenced the Commission and the legislature in
formulating amendments to the ZPO itself.
The legislature has adopted a number of important laws amending
the ZPO since the advent of the "Stuttgart Model," usually acting on
the basis of proposals from the Commissions. In 1969, a revised Law
on Subjudicial Personnel (Rechtspflegergesetz)25 substantially increased
the scope of matters assigned for final disposition to clerks and other
nonjudicial court personnel, subject to review by a judge on petition.
In 1974, a law limiting the power of parties to choose a competent court
by agreement was adopted,26 and the trial-preparing single judge was
replaced with one to whom entire cases could be assigned for final decision.27 In 1975, the mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the Federal
Supreme Court was significantly narrowed.28 The following year, in
23. See Bender, The Stuttgart Model, in II ACCESS TO JUSTICE 433 (M. Cappelletti & J.

Weisner eds. 1979). The model was based on recommendations in F. BAUR, WEGo ZU
EINER KONZENTRATION DER MUNDLICHEN VERHANDLUNG IN PROZESS (1966), which in
turn were derived from German Criminal procedure.

24. The model is described in detail in Bender, supra note 23.
25. Rechtspflegergesetz, 1969 BGBI 1 2065 (W. Ger.). For a description of the various
functions of the Rechtspfleger see Bender & Eckert, The Rechtspfteger in the Federal Republie
of Germany, in II ACCESS TO JUSTICE 477 (M. Cappelletti & J. Weisner eds. 1979).
26. Gerichtsstandsnovelle, 1974 BGBI 1 753 (W. Ger.).
27. Entlastungsnovelle, 1974 BGBI 1 365 (W. Ger.).

28. Revisionsnovelle, 1975 BGBI 1 1863 (W. Ger.).
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the context of a comprehensive reform of marital law, the entire category of marital cases was shifted from the Landgerichte to the Amisgerichte (courts of petty jurisdiction),29 special family court departments
were established in the.imtsgerichte, and special procedural rules were
adopted for their operation.30 In 1977, an inaptly named Simplification
Amendment sought a broad restructuring of the proceedings in ordinary civil cases, and was the most extensive of the current reforms,
reaching nearly every procedural step in the lawsuit. 3 ' In 1980, the
statutes governing litigation-cost assistance to the poor were completely
revised and a new statute adopted providing for aid in obtaining extra-

judicial legal advice.3 2

The remainder of this Article will discuss these reforms under
functional headings: (1) the staffing of the trial court for the particular
case; (2) the structure of the proceedings at first instance; (3) the scope
and form of review in the appellate courts; and (4) costs and legal
assistance. A conclusion will attempt some comparative observations.
III.
A.

STAFFING OF THE TRIAL COURT: SINGLE
JUDGE OR THREE-JUDGE PANEL?

Historical Development

The staffing of the court to which individual cases are assigned at
first instance in the Landgerichte has undergone several important
changes since 1877. Judicial practice in a number of districts has usually preceded the legislature's amendments to the ZPO. The original
concept embodied in the ZPO was that of the three-judge panel, taken
from traditional practice. The use of a single judge was contemplated
in two different types of situations, each sharply limited. Pretrial preparation of a case (not including proof-taking) by a single "assigned
judge" (beauftragterRichter) was permissible for certain types of cases
in which a detailed sorting out of factual issues was required before the
legal issues could be decided.3 3 For example, cases involving the correctness of an accounting or the distribution of assets were eligible for
single-judge preparation. Proof-taking by a single judge, here called a
29. 1976 BGBI1 1421 (W. Ger.) (First Family Law Reform Act).
30. Id
31. 1976 BGBI 13281 (W. Ger.) (Law for the Simplification and Expedition of Judicial
Proceedings).
32. Prozesskostenhilfegesetz, 1980 BGBI 1677 (W. Ger.) (Law on Assistance for Litigation Costs); Beratungshilfegesetz, 1980 BGBI 689 (W. Ger.) (Law on Legal Advice and Representation for Citizens with Low Income).
33. ZPO § 348 (1898).
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"judge-commissioner" (Richterkommissar), was permitted under section 355 when authorized by a specific statute, usually involving proof3 41
taking away from the courthouse, for example: on-site inspections;
examination of witnesses who could not or ought not to be brought to
court;35 or interviewing of expert witnesses. 36 It is clear that these jobs
for the single judge on assignment from the panel were regarded as
limited exceptions to the general principle of collegiality.
The 1924 amendments reflected a general perception that the advantages of the panel in evaluating evidence, resolving disputes over
the law, and formulating a reliable final judgment were counterbalanced by inadequate and dilatory preparation for trial. As early as
1906, one critic characterized the German adherence to collegiality as
"an old superstitution of the civil-servant state, that a collegium in and
of itself offers a greater guarantee of good and just decisions. ' 37 Responding to the example of the Austrian Ordinance of 1895,38 to the
success of the single judge in the Amisgerichte following the 1909 reforms and to the widespread practice developed in the Landgerichte
without the benefit of statute, the legislature introduced the trial-preparing single judge (vorbereitenderEinzelrichter). The panel was now
required to assign the case to the single judge for preparation, unless
under the circumstances a preparatory proceeding appeared unnecessary. The preparing judge was required first to seek a settlement, and
failing that, to undertake an exhaustive examination of the case with a
view toward the possibility of a decision by the panel in a single hearing. Proof-taking by the single judge was committed to his discretion. 39
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id § 372.
Id § 375.
Id § 402.
F. ADICKES, GRUNDLINIEN DURCHGREIFENDER JUSTIZREFORM 113 (1906). Adick-

es' work was quoted as thematic in BERICHT DER KOMMISSION ZUR VORBEREITUNO EINER
REFORM DER ZIVILGERICHTSBARKEIT 89 (1961) [hereinafter cited as BERICHT DER KOMMIS-

SION 1961].
38. See supra note 14. In this precise respect the German reform went beyond the Austrian, in which the role of the single judge in panel cases was limited to the first oral hearing,
where preliminary objections such as jurisdiction were dealt with and the possibilities of
resolution without full trial were explored. GOLDSCHMIDT, DIE NEUE ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 7 (1924); KLEIN & ENGEL, DER ZIVILPROZESS OSTERREICHS 261 (1927); G. PETSCHEK & F. STAGEL, ZIVILPROzEss 311 (1963). The Austrian Code of Civil Procedure
articles 245-56 2lso provided for a preparatory proceeding before a commissioner-judge, on
order of the panel, either in the cases originally contemplated by the German ZPO or where
the pleadings presented such a complex or extensive factual picture that pretrial examination of the allegations appeared appropriate for expedition and simplification of the final
oral hearing.
39. ZPO § 34911, Emmingernovelle, 1924 RGB 1 1140 (W. Ger.)
Otherwise the single judge shall advance the matter to the point that it can, as

19831

West German Civil Procedure

Final decision on certain preliminary questions and dilatory defenses,
as well as final judgment in case of default or abandonment of claim,
were also transferred to the single judge. Final judgment in contested
cases, however, remained with the panel.
Practice under this regime proved unsatisfactory in at least two
respects. First, despite an attempt to limit it in 1933 through amend-

ment,4 the single judge gradually took over, in the name of preparation, the lion's share of the proof-taking in many districts. The judge
thereby acquired the lion's share of the influence over the outcome of

evenly contested cases. 4 1 The more prepared the reporting judge was,
the less prepared were the other two judges on the panel, and thus the

less they were able to make a useful contribution. Second, the single
judge was unable or unwilling to function more efficiently in preparation and became an apparent source of delay; expedition and simplification were not forthcoming in the desired measure.42 Postwar reform
proposals tended toward two extremes, therefore, either completing the

transition to the single judge by abandoning the panel altogether, or
nearly as possible, be concluded by one hearing before the court. If a proof-taking
is necessary, the single judge can, in his discretion, either order and take the proofs,
or reserve this for the court ....
Id
40. Id § 349 II, 1933 RGB 1 855 (W. Ger.)
Otherwise the single judge shall advance the matter to the point that it can, as near
as possible, be completed by one hearing before the court. For this purpose he can
also take particular proofs; this should only be done to the extent that it appears
desirable for simplification of the hearing before the court, and insofar as it can be
assumed at the outset that the court can properly evaluate the evidence even without a direct impression of the course of the proof-taking ....
Id
41. Practice in this respect appears to have been quite varied, even among different
chambers of a single Landgericht. See Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 1, at
1206-07, 1247-48. The Preparatory Commission saw the dominance of the single judge as a
general trend. See BERICHT DER KoMMISSION 1961, supra note 37, at 90. See also
Bergerflirth, EinzelrichterundProzessreform, 41 DEUTSCHE RICHTER-ZEITUNG [DRiZI 423,
424 (1963); 0. KissEL, DER DREIST'UFIGE AUFBAU IN DER ORDENTUCHEN GERIcliTSBARKErr 50 (1970). One writer saw a tendency to use the preparing judge more sparingly
than the 1924 reform intended, but, when used at all, then for essentially all proof-taking.
Putzo, Aktuelle 2nderungen des Zivilprozessrechts zum 1.1.1975, 28 NEUE JURISTISCIlE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 185, 187 (1975).
42. Among other things, the process of shifting the case from the panel to the single
judge and back again was viewed as multiplying the number of hearings. 0. KissEL, sUpra
note 41, at 50-51; BERICHT DER KoMMISSION 1961,supra note 37, at 90. An extensive statistical study using 1971 data showed that the single judge procedure involved more hearings,
even discounting the often superfluous final hearing before the paneL See 11 W. BLOMEYER
& D. LEIPOLD, TATSACHEN ZUR REFORM DER ZIVILGERIcHrsBARKEIT 197 (1974).
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reembracing the "three heads are better than one" idea and restoring
the panel to its former glory.
The most radical of the first type came to be called the "great judicial reform" (grosse Juslizreform).43 It would have merged the Awlsgericht and the Landgerichl into a single entry-level court, and would
have established the single judge as the source of all final judgments at
first instance. Practice had put the single judge into the driver's seat
anyway, it was argued, and making the panel participate in the final
judgment added to their burdens without demonstrable benefit to the
system's overall goals." Furthermore, once the single judge was established in the Landgericht, the principle of equality of treatment of all
civil cases compelled merger with theAmisgericht.45 In 1961, the Pre-

paratory Commission accepted the single judge but rejected merger on
the ground that there was a need for more localized justice in certain
types of cases. Since they could not identify any satisfactory criteria for
allocating Landgericht cases between a single judge and the panel,
the
46
board.
the
across
judge
single
the
recommended
Commission
In the mid-1960's, on the other hand, the Stuttgart Model sought
to reinforce the panel system by requiring the panel in appropriate
cases to be actively involved in the entire post-pleading process, beginning with the preliminary conference at which the proof-taking and
trial were planned.4 7 In the literature supporting this aspect of the

model, the operative assumption was that the panel becomes more effective and efficient with increasing complexity, whether factual or legal.48 A "reporter" is used in the model, but only as the panel member
principally responsible for digesting the written exchanges of the parties in preparation for the preliminary conference. 49 -The "preparing
judge" has been used in some courts under the model, particularly in
cases involving a large number of disputed items, such as commercial
commission or construction-contract disputes.5" Nonetheless, the Stutt43. For perhaps the most comprehensive statement of this position, see 0. KISSEL, sllpra
note 41.
44. Id at 47.
45. On the superficiality of this conception of equality, see Hanack, Bedt)rfnisprq &'ug
und Methodenkrilk einer Justizreform, 87 ZZP 405, 409 (1974).
46. BERICHT DER KOMMISSION 1961, supra note 37, at 74-77.
47. See Bender, supra note 23, at 445f.
48. See id at 445; Stotter, Vereinfachungsnovelle und Entlastungsgesetz (Andering der
ZPO), 29 MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT [MDR] 265-66 (1975).
49. Bender supra note 23, at 448.

50. See Baumgfrtel, Das Mandlichketsprinzip und die hierzu bestehenden Reformnver.
suche, insbesondere das Stuttgarter Model, 27 JURISTISCHE RIJNDSCHAU [JR] 309, 314
(1973).
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gart Model remains closely identified with the panel system.
B.

The Legislative Solution
The solution ultimately reached by the legislature in 1974 consti-

tutes a rather complex compromise between these extremes. It abolished the "preparing judge" altogether and replaced it with a casedeciding single judge.5 ' Under the new ZPO section 348,52 however, it
is the panel to which the case is originally assigned which decides, in its
discretion, whether to assign the case to one of its members for full

determination. No criteria are given for making this decision; the provision merely precludes such transfer where the case presents "special

difficulties" of a factual or legal nature, or where it is of "fundamental
importance."5 3 If the panel retains the case, its authority to commis-

sion a single judge to take proofs away from court remains intact.'
Indeed those provisions which refer to the "trial court" apply equally to
the case-deciding single judge operating under section 348, if such assignment is made.5

A further reform was adopted in the First Family Law Reform Act
of 1976, which removes a large category of cases from the panel system
altogether. All marital cases are now in the exclusive jurisdiction of the

Family Courts, which are divisions of the Amtsgericht and which are
staffed by single judges. 56 Under prior practice, marital cases were in
the category of cases in which the use of the single judge was most
51. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
52. ZPO § 348 (1974).
53. Id Section 348 provides in full
(1) The civil chamber may transfer the case to one of its members as single judge
for decision, unless
1. the case presents special difficulties of a factual or legal nature or
2. the case is of fundamental legal importance.
(2) The chamber may decide on transfer to the single judge without a hearing.
The order is not appealable.
(3) The case may not be transferred to the single judge, if the merits have already
been reached in the principal hearing before the chamber, unless in the interim a
temporary, partial or interlocutory judgment has been rendered.
(4) The single judge may after hearing the parties transfer the case back to the
chamber, if it appears from a fundamental change in the procedural situation that
the decision is of fundamental importance. A further transfer to the single judge is
excluded.
54. Id §§ 355, 375.
55. See, ag., A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH & P. HART.MANN, ZPO § 348 Anm. I
(39th ed. 1981).
56. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVerfG] § 23(b) (1975) (creating the Family Court and
defining "family matters"); ZPO § 606 (1975) (defining exclusive territorial jurisdiction of
family courts).

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

(Vol, 6

prevalent, and in which assignment to the case-deciding single judge

after the 1974 amendment was most common. In terms of court staffing, therefore, the reform largely confirmed existing practice.

7

Published decisions interpreting section 348 have been few and not
very helpful. It has been held that the assignment must be made by the

panel, and that an order signed by only two of the three members is
insufficient.5" Moreover, the assignment must occur at or before the
beginning of the principal hearing on the merits (Hauptermin). Preparatory hearings are not considered to be on the merits, even if an
order for proof-taking is made simultaneously with the assignment.5 9
directed to the merits is untimely, even
But assignment after a hearing
60
if the hearing is suspended.
The assignment is difficult to challenge, however. The plaintiff is

expected to indicate objections in his complaint 6 t and the court must,
with service, inquire of the defendant whether there are any objections
to assignment of the case to a single judge. 62 Consent is usually forth-

coming, but objection is seldom ignored. There is debate on whether
the assignment order, which is expressly made nonappealable under
section 348, can be reviewed at all by an appellate court. The rationale
is that of "essential procedural error" justifying remand.63 The cases
are in conffict on whether violation of section 348 is such an error.64 In
any event, the parties, whose attorneys were already used to single

judges in prior practice and generally wish to keep peace with their
57. See Federal Justice Ministry, Answer to Question from Bundestag, Mar. 17, 1976,
reprintedin 54 DRiZ 219 (1976). On the pre-1976 practice, see F. STEIN, M. JONAS, & J.
POHL, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, Anm. vor art. 606 IV 1 (19th cd, 1968),
On the procedural aspects of the Marriage Law Reform Act, see generally Diedrichsen,
Entwicklung undFunktiondes Eheprozessrechts, 91 ZZP 397 (1978). See also Blankenburg,
Ober die Wirksamkeit und Unwirksamkeit einer Zhiiprozessnovelle, 34 JURISTENZEITUNO
[JZ] 216, 217 (1979) (nearly 90% of all marital matters in Baden-Wurttemberg were handled
by single judges in the period of 1977 prior to reorganization).
58. Judgment of Mar. 29, 1979, Kammergericht Berlin, 33 MDR 765.
59. Judgment of Aug. 9, 1977, Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Schleswig, 216 Schleswig-Holsteinische Anzeigen [SchHA] 68; Judgment of Mar. 8, 1979, OLG Dtlsseldorf, 1975 Justizministerialblatt f'0r Nordrhein-Westfalen [JMB INRW] 116.
60. Judgment of Oct. 26, 1978, OLG Dusseldorf, 1979 JMB1NRW 15.
61. ZPO § 253.
62. Id § 271.
63. Id § 539.
64. Judgment of Mar. 29, 1979, Kammergericht Berlin, 33 MDR 764; Judgment of Mar.
8, 1979, OLG Dusseldorf, 1979 JMBINRW 116 (8th Civ. Sen.); A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH & J. ALBERS, ZPO § 539 Anm. I(B) (39th ed. 1981) (all taking the position that violation of § 348 is an "essential procedural error"). Contra Judgment of July 31, 1980, OLG
Dusseldorf, 34 NJW 352 (4th Civ. Sen.). See also Judgment of Aug. 9, 1977, OLG Schieswig, 216 ScHHA 68.
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judges, and who also have access to an appellate court with three
judges anyway, appear to have little motivation to complain.

For these reasons it is likely that the constitutional objections to
the procedure may remain undecided. The basis for objection is that

without setting forth criteria for the decision, the assignment is left to
the court's discretion, thus depriving the parties of their "lawful judge"

under Article 101 of the Basic Law.65 That provision has been interpreted as requiring that the parties be in a position to determine in
advance, as far as practicable, who will decide their case.6 This objec-

tion was made by the government when the discretionary feature was
first introduced in the legislature,6 7 but the upper house committee re-

jected it, citing cases where the discretion of the courts to assign to certain judges was upheld.68 Much of the literature favors the view that

the discretion provided by section 348 is unconstitutional.69 Of special
concern is the fact that the legislature expressly justified the discretion
upon the need, among other things, to consider the qualifications and
work load of the particular judge to whom the case would be assigned. 70 This is considered by the opponents to be an inappropriate

basis for determining what type of court should try the case.7 In typical panel practice, however, the issue is muted to minor significance:
the case will be assigned in any event on a strictly rotating basis to one
65. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, § 101, May 23, 1949, BGBI III
100-01 (W. Ger.).
66. See, eg., Order of Mar. 24, 1964, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 17 [BVerfGE] 294, 297; F. STEIN, M.
JONAS, & E. SCHUMAN, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNO, Einleitung X(C)(1)(d)
275 (20th ed. 1979). For a more detailed discussion, see Fisch, Recent Reforms in German
Civil Procedure the ConstitutionalDimension, I Civ. JUST. Q. 33, 37-38 (1982).
67. See Feaux de la Croix, Gedanken zur Ziviiprozessreform, in FE.SHItnTr FOR P.
M6HRING 53, 60 (1975).
68. See Kramer, DieEinzelrichternovelleundrrt.10112 GG, 32 JZ 11, 12 (1977); Judgment of Feb. 3, 1965, BVerfG, 18 BVertGE 344,351 (discretion of presiding judge to assign
judges to particular cases); Judgment of Oct. 25, 1966, BVerfG, 20 BVerfGE 336, 344 (discretion of highest appellate court, on reversal of judgment below, to remand it to another
court for further decision).
69. Feaux de la Croix, supra note 67; Kramer, supra note 68; Schultze, DerStreit um die
[lbertragung der Beweisaufnahme auf dem beaufgtragten Richter, 30 NJW, 409, 410-11
(1977); Maller, Beweisaufnahme vordem beauf/ragtenRichter, 55 DRiZ 305 (1977) (and citations therein); Baur, Book Review, 91 ZZP, 329, 330 (1978); Bettermann, supra note 7 at
394f; A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH, & P. HARTMANN, supra note 55, ZPO § 348 Anm. 1.
Contra Rasehorn, Der EinzlerichterinZivilsachen verfassungs und Praxirgemarsr, 30 NJW
789 (1977); Stanicki, Der Einzelrichterbeimn Landgericht alr gesetzlicher Richter, 57 DRiZ
342 (1979).
70. See Kramer, supra note 68, at 15.
71. d; Feaux de la Croix, supra note 67, at 61.
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of the panel members as reporting judge, with the responsibility for
going over the initial papers and helping the presiding judge prepare
for hearings. Any assignments under section 348 will be made to this
judge, whose identity will be known to the lawyers before assignment is
made.72
Practice under section 348 has been astonishingly varied, from
court to court and from chamber to chamber of the same Landgericht,
Much of the opposition to abolition of the collegial system had come
from the judiciary itself, with many judges valuing the collegial judgment even where the bulk of the preparatory work and the taking of
evidence had been done by the single judge. Since the new law forces a
choice between the case-deciding single judge and the case-deciding
panel, and since family matters have now been taken out of the collegial courts altogether, any given panel can be expected to make less use
of section 348 than comparative use of the old preparing single judge.
Still, the literature indicates a use rate varying from high to low, and
everything in between.73
Factors to be taken into account regarding section 348 assignments
can at least be identified. Case-related factors favoring retention by the
panel are: (a) ripeness of the case for decision after initial pleading,
without further extensive judicial preparation;7 4 and (b) special concern for the reliability and persuasiveness of the final decision, resulting from the fundamental legal importance of the case 75 or from the
complexity of the issues.7 6 Assignment is favored, on the other hand, in
72. This practice was observed in a chamber of the Landgericht Freiburg in May, 1981.
See also Putzo, supra note 41, at 188 (suggesting it as the most logical practice).
73. The Ministry of Justice reported in 1976, a little more than a year after the singlejudge reform was introduced, a range from 5 to 95% among various courts, 54 DRiZ 219
(1976). It has been reported that most chambers of the Landgericht Koblenz assigned only
marital matters to single judges. Klinge, Erste Erfahrungen mit dem Entlaslungsgesetz, 26
ANWALTSBLATr [AnwBl] 74 (1975). In the Landgerichlen Baden-Wtlrttemberg, in the years
1975-1977, an average of less than half of the non-marital matters were assigned to single
judges. Blankenburg, supra note 57, at 216. Schultze, supra note 69, reported a range of 9.8
to 82.3% for Hessen in 1975-1976. In the chamber of the Landgerichl Freiburg which I
observed, the presiding judge indicated that currently 70 to 80% of its cases were decided by
single judges, and a random sample of 1980 files confirmed this estimate.
74. See Holch, Prozessverschleppung durch den Einzelrichter?, 13 ZEITSCfIRIFT FOR
RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 38, 40 (1980).
75. The standard used by the statute, according to which assignment is prohibited, is
one well outlined in judicial interpretations of ZPO § 546, requiring appellate courts to authorize revision by the Federal Supreme Court when the case has a value of less than DM
40,000 (currently) but is of fundamental importance. See, e.g., H. PRtJTTINa, DIE ZULASSUNG DER REVISION 101 (1977); A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH, & J. ALBERS, supra note
64, ZPO § 546 Anm. 2B.
76. Here there is practically no case law, and commentaries such as A. BAUMBACII, W,
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cases involving numerous similar issues, such as commercial agent accountings or construction-contract disputes, in which factual details
dominate rather than probative or conceptual difficulty 77 Administrative factors include caseload, which presumably tends to favor assignment as a spreading device, and the strength and experience of the
individual judge to whom assignment would be made."8 The most important factor of all, however, is that of style and preference, in which
the strongest personality will usually be that of the presiding judge.
The presiding judge is generally responsible for the allocation of workload within the chamber, 9 is required to preside over all chamber
hearings,8" is the first to see all incoming files, and will therefore generally guide the decision on assignment. It cannot be expected that such
a decision, which must be made in every case, will be heavily debated
within the chamber; it is usually made by rules of thumb founded on
common understanding, but guided by the presiding judge.
It is still asserted that the former practice of leaving everything but
final judgment to the preparing single judge remains alive in many
courts, 8 ' despite the fact that the only authority for proof-taking by
such a single judge is limited to cases in which it is impracticable to do
so in the courtroom. 8 2 Under the prior law it had been established that
a breach of section 355 limitations was subject to waiver, in particular
by failing to object at the time of the proof-taking. An objection could
not be raised for the first time on appeal.83 The courts have continued
to adhere to this doctrine, on the ground that the principle of immediacy is at stake, a principle designed for the protection of the parties
and, therefore, presumably subject to their agreement.84 A rare case of
reversal was based on the finding that the particular chamber had systematically ignored the limitations of section 355 and had invited
& P. HARTMANN, .supranote 55, ZPO § 348 Anm. 2A arc left with a tentative
list of plausible factors.
77. See Holch, supra note 74, at n.23 (citing legislative history showing that such cases
were considered assignable by the draftsmen).
78. See A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH & P. HARTMANN, upra note 55, ZPO § 348
Anm. 2A.
79. GVERFG § 21g (1972).
80. ZPO § 136 (1950).
LAUTERBACH,

81. Rudolph, Die Zivi/prozesslandschafi, 56 DRiZ 366 (1978).

82. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
83. See Judgment of Oct. 16, 1963, Bundesgerichtshof, 40 ENTSCHEiDuNEN DES
BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 179 (and citations therein).
84. Judgment of Feb. 2, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof, 33 MDR 567, 32 NJW 2528 (and
citations therein); Judgment of Nov. 11, 1977, OLG Hamm, 32 MDR 676; Judgment of June
7, 1977, OLG Dtisseldorf, 32 MDR 60.
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agreement in the specific case.85 Thus, while the reforms made legisla-

tive disapproval of the practice clearer than before, they left it largely
unsanctioned.
The question of quality, of which system is best, remains essentially unanswered. More precisely, the current approach of maximum
flexibility and adaptability to the skills and personalities of the individual judges probably offers the best answer. An attempt was made by
Blankenburg8 6 to assess, by a special statistical study, whether the casedeciding single judge was more or less efficient than the panel. The
resulting figures show that single-judge proceedings have taken longer
than panel proceedings, and thereby confirm findings of an earlier
study of the pre-1977 preparing single judge.87
The tempting conclusion that the single judge is inherently slower
is weakened, however, by the operation of two of the best settled rules
of thumb concerning assignment: (1) that cases ripe for immediate decision are not assigned; and (2) that cases involving much tedious detail
are assigned."" The findings are thus less than conclusive. The statistics regularly published by the government do not reflect the operation
of section 348 at all, either in terms of elapsed time or of frequency of
appeals and reversals. At best such data might be expected to both
confirm and relativize the three common sense assumptions which have
fueled most of the debate: (1) that difficult questions are more thoroughly weighed by three heads than by one; (2) that more sheer work
can be done by three people separately than by the same three jointly;
and (3) that human productivity is less determined by formal structure
than by training, personality, and motivation.
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AT
FIRST INSTANCE
By far the most important of the recent wave of amendments, the
"Simplification Amendment" of 1977,89 dealt chiefly with the proce-'
dure on the merits at first instance. As noted above, the principal goal
of these changes was efficiency and economy, to combat a perceived
and persistent tendency to delay. Already under existing law, dating
back at least as far as 1924, the court, in principle, was to try to dispose
85. Judgment of Feb. 18, 1976, OLG D(Isseldorf, 29 NJW 1103.
86. See Blankenburg, supra note 57.
87. See W. BLOMEYER & D. LEIPOLD, supra note 42.

88. Blankenburg, supra note 57, at 218; Holch, supra note 74, at 40.
89. 1976 BGB1 I 3281 (W. Ger.).
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of the case in a single oral hearing.' But the "preparation process,"
largely planned only from one step to the next, itself tended to produce
multiple hearings. Typical cases, therefore, were taking half a dozen or
more hearings and many months to complete. 9 ' The Stuttgart Model 9'
sought to realize the single hearing goal by means of written pretrial
procedure and tight scheduling, eventually achieving an average ofjust
over two meetings per case. 93 The 1961 report of the Preparatory Commission, on the other hand, recommended an early first hearing for the
purpose of disposing of the easy cases and planning preparation for a
final hearing in the difficult ones. 94 The legislature, following the pattern set with the single-judge problem, adopted both models, formulated as options in the preparation of the final hearing to be chosen in
the court's discretion. 5 The amendment also strengthened the formal
position of the judge in setting deadlines for the presentation of claims
and defenses, in encouraging settlement, and in directing the final hearing. Finally, the 1977 amendment attempted a revision of the two principal procedures for rendering enforceable judgments without a
contested hearing: the so called "dunning process"' 6 and the judgment
by default. These revisions and a few other minor changes will be discussed in roughly the order in which they would be encountered in a
typical lawsuit.
A.

Steering the Lawsuit: Calendar Control and Service of
Documents
With the Amtsgericht reforms of 1909 and the Landgericht reforms

of 1924, the courts assumed general responsibility for fixing deadlines
and hearing dates, as well as for service of important judicial docu90. ZPO § 272b (1950).
91. G. BAUMGARTEL & P. MEs, RECHTSTATSACHEN ZUR DAUER DES ZIVILPROZESSES

(ersterInsta z) 170 (1972) (data gathered in 1970-71, indicated that 63% of all ftisgerichr
cases and 49.4% of all Landgericht cases were completed with five or fewer hearings and
conferences); II E. BLANKENBURG, H. MORASH & H. WOLFF, TATSACIIEN ZUR REFORM
DER Z1VILGERICHTSBARKEIT 49 (1974) (data gathered in 1971, found that cases pursued to
contested judgment required an average of from 4.2 to 8.5 hearings (or conferences), depending on the court, the type of case, and whether any proof-taking occurred).
92. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
93. E. BLANKENBURG, H. MORASH & H. WOLFF, supra note 91 reported 2.2-3 hearings
including pretrial conference and proof-taking for the Stuttgart Model.
94. BERiCrr DER KOMMISSION 1961, supra note 37, at 204. The Second Commission
pursued this recommendation. See BERICHT DER KOMMissioN 1977, supra note 2, at 33.

95. ZPO § 272 (1977).
96. For the prior law see Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note I, at 1265-67:

ZPO §§ 688-703d (1977) (current law).
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ments such as complaints, answers, and essentially all party documents
requesting any sort of action by the court relating to the merits. 97
Under the Simplification Amendment of 1977,98 service of judgments
was added to the court's responsibilities.99 The parties may still serve
judgments to expedite execution;1 °° and they remain responsible for
serving attachment orders' 0 ' and other orders granting temporary or
preliminary relief. 12
B.

Preparing the Principal Hearing

Former ZPO section 272(b) °3 called for the disposition of the case
"as far as possible in one oral argument" (mfindliche Verhandung).
The new ZPO in section 272 I, puts the matter somewhat more forcefully, with a revealing change in terminology: "The case is as a rule to
be disposed of in one comprehensively prepared hearing for oral argument (principal hearing)."'' " Section 272 then prescribes the manner of
preparation for the principal hearing, either an early oral hearing or a
written pretrial procedure, reserving the choice of procedure to the discretion of the presiding judge. 10 5 Section 273 directs the court to take
all necessary preparatory measures and to cause the parties to declare
themselves promptly and completely."° Additionally, this section specifically authorizes the court, before any hearing, to require the parties
to explain or expand on their pleadings within specified time limits; to
request information from, or production of, documents by public officials; to direct the appearance
of the parties; and to subpoena witnesses
07
to testify at the hearing.1
1. Early First Hearing
The statute provides no guidance as to when to choose a first hear97. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
98. 1976 BGBI 13281 (W. Ger.).
99. ZPO § 317 (1977). On service generally, see id § 270; L. RosENBERo & K.
SCHWAB, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT § 73 (13th ed. 1981); A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERDACII & P.
HARTMANN, supra note 55, ZPO § 270 Anm. 2.
100. ZPO § 750 1 (1977).

101. Id § 922.
102. Id § 936 (incorporating ZPO § 911 by reference).
103. ZPO § 272(b) (1950).
104. Id § 272 1 (1977). Thus, the confusion created by the concept of "continuous oral
argument" is avoided. This concept allowed a mrlndliche Verhandlung to dissolve into many
Termine in the absence of serious pressure.
105. Id.
106. Id § 273.
107. Id
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ing or a written pretrial procedure. Section 275 merely provides that in
preparation for such a first hearing, a deadline for answer may be
set. t"' If the case is not resolved at the hearing, section 275 requires the
court to take all measures still necessary to prepare the principal hearing, including the setting of a deadline for answer. In practice, the
choice depends upon a number of factors, not the least of which is the
general inclination of the presiding judge.10 9 In particular, the first
hearing is favored where the case appears likely to be settled or uncontested, or where there is a good chance that proof-taking will be unnecAn early first hearing is
essary in preparing the case for decision."
case with the parties
the
discuss
to
necessary
it
is
where
also favored
before it becomes clear what preparatory measures will be required."'
2.

Written Pretrial Procedure

When the written pretrial procedure alternative is chosen, section
276 requires the court to set two deadlines for the defendant: notice of
intention to contest the claim must be filed within two weeks of service,
and the claim must be answered within at least an additional two
weeks., 2 The court may also set a deadline for a reply. t 3 This
method may be chosen where the case is straightforward and prooftaking appears necessary either for settlement or for judgment, where
the case is one of factual detail (with many specific issues, such as accountings) and the complaint is clear enough to allow the defendant to
answer point for point,1 4 where it appears likely that defendant will
default," 5 or even where the court's calendar is so crowded that an
early hearing cannot be scheduled early enough to be especially
108. Id § 275. This is normally done in the Landgericht of Hamburg and of Freiburg.
which I observed, and it appears to be the general rule. See the form of order reprinted in
G.

VON CRAUSHAAR,

ZIVILPROZESS UND ZWANGSVOLLSTRECKUNG

60 (1979).

See also

Walchshbfer, Die Auswirkungen der Vereinfachungsnotelle in der gerichtlichen Praxis. 94
ZZP 179 (1981).
109. See, e.g., Walchshofer, supra note 108, at 181 (reporting on a survey of all Bavarian
courts in 1978); Grunsky, Die Straffung des Veyfahrens durch die Vereinfachungsnorelle. 32
JZ 201, 202 (1977); Franzki, Die Vereinfachungsnotelleand ihre bisherigeBewahrung in der
Ved'ahrenswirklich Keit, 32 NJW 9 (1979).
110. See BUNDESTAG DRUCKSACHE 7/2729 35 (Nov. 5, 1974) (the Government's explanation of its draft); A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH & P. HARTMANN, supra note 55. ZPO
§ 272 Anm. 3B.
111. Id
112. ZPO § 276 (1977).
113. Id
114. A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH & P. HARTMANN,,supra note 55. ZPO § 272 Anm.
3B.
115. Id
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useful. 11 6
Although it has complicated rather than simplified the procedure,
the legislature's decision to provide a choice between alternative methods of preparation has generally been well accepted by the judiciary
and the bar." 7 A 1978 survey of Bavarian courts showed that most
courts made substantial use of both methods, but where a strong preference was shown, the single-judgeAmisgericht, tended toward the written procedure and the collegial Landgerichl tended toward the oral
procedure." 8 The same study found no evidence that the choice of
preparatory procedure affected the overall length of the lawsuit." 19
C. Judgment Without Hearing
In a number of situations, the ZPO contemplates the possibility of
a judgment without a hearing. The 1977 amendments generally sought
to refine the previous rules so as to limit their use as well as to make
them more efficient.
1. Contested Cases
Section 128 II, for example, deals with the agreement of the parties
to a judgment without a hearing. 20 The 1977 amendments provide for
withdrawal of consent only after an essential change in procedural circumstances, require the immediate setting of deadlines, and limit to
three months the length of time within which judgment must be rendered after consent is given. 12 ' The purpose of these changes was to
discourage a perceived practice of extending the device to complex
22
cases, resulting in undue delay.'
Without the consent of the parties, the court may order an entirely
written procedure for cases involving DM 500 or less in controversy,
where representation by an attorney is not required (Amisgericht) and a
hearing would cause a party undue hardship. 123 This provision replaced one under which DM 50 cases could be referred to an arbitrator. 24 The party for whose benefit the procedure is ordered may
116. See Grunsky, supra note 109, at 202.
117. See, e.g., Hartmann, Ein Jahr Vereinfachungsnovelle, 30 NJW 1458 (1978).
118. Walchsh6fer, supra note 108, at 181-82.
119. Id at 182.
120. ZPO § 128 11 (1977).
121. Id
122. BUNDESTAG DRUCKSACHE 7/2729, supra note 110, at 39-40.
123. ZPO § 128 III (1977).
124. For criticism of this exchange of unlike procedures, see Leipold, Gerichie und
Verfahrenfur geringiigigeSretigkeiten, in HUMANE JUSTIZ 106 (P. Gilles ed. 1977).
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demand a hearing, but it was hoped that the procedure would be more
extensively used than its predecessor."2
2. Default Judgments
Where a written pretrial procedure is chosen under ZPO section
276 and the defendant fails to make a timely declaration of his intention to defend, a default judgment may be entered against him without
a hearing. 2 6 Otherwise, the traditional definition of default, which is
the failure to appear at the oral argument itself, is retained. t27 The

principal sanction for failure to meet a deadline for the answer is the
preclusion of defenses.' 2 8
3.

The "Dunning Process"

The "dunning process" has taken on an increasing role in every-

day practice during recent decades. This procedure allows a claim for
a specific sum of money to be submitted to the court for an exparte
payment order, upon which execution can be levied if no objection is
submitted within a specified period.

29

While a relatively small propor-

tion of payment orders produce objection,' 30 nearly forty-five percent
of all civil cases in the Amtsgericht' 3' and over thirty-five percent of
those in the Landgericht 3 2 are begun with a dunning procedure. The
125. BUNDESTAG DRUCKSACHE 7/2729, supra note 110, at 40.
126. ZPO § 331 III (1976).
127. Id § 331 I. See Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 1, at 1262-63.
128. ZPO § 296 (1977).
129. For the prior law, see Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 1, at 1265-67.
The "specific sum of money" of ZPO § 688 I is not a term of art comparable to the "sum
certain" in Anglo-American law, but can arise out of a claim for personal injury or property
damage and is not limited in amount. See G. voN CRAUSHAAR, supra note 108, at 46-47.
130. In 1981, 5,275,629 dunning cases were commenced nationwide. In that year the
Amisgerichte disposed of 425,020 cases, and the Landgerichte 122,433 cases, which had been
begun by a dunning petition. Statistisches Bundesamt Wierbaden, RECHTSPFLEGE
ZIVILGERICHTE, fachserie 10, Reihe 2, tables 4.1, 4.5 & 5.5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
RECHTSPFLEGE]. This relationship of about one in 10 cases producing objection represents a
slight decline in recent years. For 1980 there were 4,652,215 dunning petitiohs with 500,229
dispositions after objection for 10.8%. Id tables 3.1, 3.5 & 4.5 (1980). For 1979: 4,319,733
petitions with 477,751 dispositions for 11%. Id (1979). For 1978: 4,237,605 petitions with
512,150 dispositions for 12%. Id (1978). For 1977: 4,408,659 petitions with 578,460 dispositions for 13%. Id (1977).
131. For 1981: 425,020 of 977,064 for 43.5%. Id tables 4.5 & 4.3 (1981). For 1980:
393,276 of 915,059 for 43.0%. Id tables 3.5 & 3.3 (1980). For 1979: 387,509 of 881,923 for
43.9%. Id (1979). For 1978: 423,361 of 913,873 for 46.3%. Id (1978). For 1977: 480,909
of 973,566 for 49.3%. Id (1977).
132. 1981: 3.3%. Id table 5.5 (1981). 1980: 37.4%. Id (1980). 1979: 36.5%. Id (1979).
1978: 36.4%. Id (1978). 1977: 39.3%. Id (1977).
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1977 reforms of this numerically important device have been among
the most heavily criticized.' 3 3 These reforms purported to serve somewhat conflicting goals: to increase the debtor's protection against unjustified claims, to rationalize and expedite the procedure, and to
prepare the way for computerization. 34 The first goal was honored by
extending the deadline for objection to two weeks from service,1 35 precluding demand for execution order until after expiration of the objection deadline,' 3 6 and requiring that the demand for execution order
recite any payments received. 13 The second goal was served by adopting uniform printed forms, 38 reducing the detail required in specifying
the basis for the claim, 3 9 and making the claimant's home court the
exclusive venue.' 40 The third goal was furthered not only by the uniform forms but also by the authorization of a14national program and a
centralized administration within each Land.'
The greatest administrative difficulties arise from the venue rules,
The petition must be filed in the plaintiff's home court. Upon objection
and request for trial, it must be transferred to the court designated by
the plaintiff in his petition as the defendant's domestic home venue.
The second court must again transfer the case on finding itself not competent.' 42 At least one writer finds a decline in relative utilization of
this procedure attributable to these administrative difficulties, 4 3 but
the national statistics suggest, if anything, both a marginal increase in
relative use and a marginal decrease in the frequency of objection since
the reforms. 4 4
133. See Schulz, 11 ZRP 93 (1978) (reporting the position of the Federation of German
Rechtspfleger); Hartmann, supra note 117, at 1464; Franzki, supra note 109, at 14.
134. BUNDESTAG DRUCKSACHE 7/2729, supra note 110, at 46.
135. ZPO § 692 1 3 (1977). The previous deadlines had varied from 24 hours to one
week.

136. Id. § 699 I.
137. Id
138. Id § 703c.
139. Id § 690 1 3 (the section requires a "designation" (Bezeichnung), whereas it formerly required a "substantiation" (Begrindung)).
140. Id § 689 I 2.
141. Id §§ 703b, 689 13.
142. Id § 696 I, in conjunction with § 692 1 6. More than 10% of all dunning cases sent
to the regular calendar require transfer to a court other than that designated in the dunning
notice. See Holch, Mahnverfahren Zwischen Schuldnerschutz und Entlaslungsfunkllon, 14
ZRP 281 (1981).
143. Id (emphasizing figures from Baden-Wtlrttemberg).
144. The ratio of dunning petitions to regular court commencements (both Amisgerichte
and Landgerichte) increased from 3.26/1 in 1977, RECHTSPFLEGE, supra note 130, tables 3.1
and 4.1 (1977), to 3.64/1 in 1981. Id tables 4.1 and 5.1 (1981). The frequency of objection
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Enforcing Concentration: Deadlines and Preclusion
1. Deadlines

Under prior law, deadlines played only a minor role in driving the
lawsuit to a conclusion. As a practical matter, the setting of a date for
oral argument was the principal means, because the parties were required to submit preparatory writings before the hearing. 4 5 The Stuttgart Model was able to find permissive authority in section 272b for its
system of strict deadlines. 4 6 Moreover, section 279a called for the setting of a deadline for written clarification of points which remain unclear after the hearing. 4 7 In the normal case, however, the use of
deadlines imposed on the parties was desultory at best because the
court itself was not under heavy statutory pressure to reach the final
hearing.
Under the 1977 reforms, on the other hand, the deadline forms a
centerpiece of the procedural rules. The new mandatory deadlines for
an answer in the written' 48 and early first hearing 4 9 preparatory procedures, as well as the permissive deadline for reply 150 have already been
mentioned. In addition, section 273 II authorizes setting a deadline for
a statement of position on unclear points prior to any hearing.' 5 ' Section 283 authorizes setting a deadline for written response, after the
principal hearing, to matters presented by the other side where a party
52
has been unable to respond because of surprise.
The most important deadline is that for the answer. In terms of
practice, perhaps the most interesting question is the extent to which
the courts use the discretionary deadline prior to an early first hearing,
pursuant to section 275. Use of the discretionary deadline is quite frequent, particularly where crowded court calendars preclude setting an
early hearing before four to six weeks after filing of the complaint,
requiring transfer of dunning petitions to the regular court calendar appears to have declined from 13% to a little over 10%. See id
145. See Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 1, at 1218. ZPO § 129 (requiring
party writings as preparation for hearings in lawyer-represented cases) and § 132 (requiring
writings containing new factual allegations to be served at least one week before the hearing)
have been retained.
146. See Bender, supra note 23, at 464-65. The term Frert (deadline) was not even mentioned in § 272b.
147. See F. STaN, M. JONAS, E. SCHUMANN & D. LEIPOLD, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZivJLPROZESSORONUNG § 279(a) Anm. II (19th ed. 1968).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
150. ZPO §§ 275 IV, 176 III (1977).
151. Id § 273 II.
152. Id § 283.
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Use of the prehearing

deadline for clarification of specified issues seems to be less widespread, especially with an early first hearing, whose purpose is one of
clarification anyway.
2.

Duties to Expedite

The court's duties to expedite judicial proceedings have already

been mentioned in connection with preparatory measures1 54 and deadlines.1 55 For the first time, however, the 1977 reform also added an

express duty of the parties to expedite the proceedings. Section 282
requires the parties to present their materials in a timely fashion at the
hearing, and to extend, before the hearing, materials to the other side
that would facilitate adequate response at the hearing.156 Section 282
III requires the defendant to present defenses which go to the permissibility of the complaint before the main hearing, and by the deadline for
answer, if one is set.' 57 Section 277 I requires the defendant to present

his defenses in the answer, insofar as the procedural situation and expedition call for it. The principle that the parties may present their
materials at any time until the close of the hearing on the basis of
which the judgment is rendered, understood as a consequence of the
concept of the "unity of oral argument"' 58 and expressed literally in

former ZPO section 278, is no longer stated directly in the code. 159 In153. See supra text accompanying note 108. The Bundesgerichtshof has held that the
notice of deadline must inform the defendant (who at this point normally is not yet rcpresented by counsel) exactly how to meet it, and that the court must also inform the defendant
of the effect on the deadline of subsequent submissions by the plaintiff, in order for the
defendant's tardiness in answering to support preclusion. Judgment of Jan. 12, 1983,
Bundesgerichtshof, 36 NJW 822.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54.
156. ZPO § 282 provides that:
1. Each party shall present his material in support of claims or defenses at the
oral hearing . . . with that promptness called for in the procedural situation by
careful and expeditious case management.
II. Demands for relief and other material to which the opponent probably could
not respond without advance notice shall be transmitted early enough before the
oral argument to allow the opponent to gather the necessary information.
157. Id. § 282 III. This is a substantially expanded version of former ZPO § 274, which
covered only certain so-called "dilatory defenses" (orozesshindernde Einreden). Itis doubtful whether the preclusive effect of ZPO § 282 III is broader than its predecessor, since many
of the defenses now covered are non-waivable and subject to judicial control sua sponte.
See A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH & P. HARTMANN, supra note 55, ZPO § 282 Anm, 5.
158. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
159. Compare L. ROSENBERG & K. SCHWAB, supra note 99, § 81 (to the effect that the
principle still applies, although the law provides for preclusion of late material); A. BAUM-
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stead we find only its negative corollary, that new material can no
longer be presented after the close of the final hearing.'
3. Preclusion
Under the prior law, preclusion of late material fell into two categories, each with a different standard of fault. The first and most important provision applied either where material was offered after the
first hearing at which it was appropriate, or where it was not alleged in
a timely preparatory writing as required. 6' This provision permitted
the court in its discretion to preclude such material, if it was shown
both (1) that admission of the material would delay conclusion of the
lawsuit, and (2) that the untimeliness was attributable either to intent to
delay or to gross negligence.' 62 The second provision, not often used
and less often disputed, applied where a party failed to meet a courtimposed deadline for clarification of matters which remained unclear
after the hearing. That provision permitted the court in its discretion to
refuse to consider an untimely
clarification if the party failed ade63
quately to excuse the delay.'
An example'" from the sparse postwar case law illustrates the
reluctance with which this authority was exercised. The plaintiff's
complaint was served on the defendants on March 18, 1972, a supplementary complaint was served on April 26 and the first hearing was
held on May 17 at which time the defendants did not appear. On June
14, the resulting default judgment was served. The defendants first
hired a lawyer on June 19, who then reopened the default judgment.
The plaintiff served a memorandum on the defendants on July 24 complaining about delaying tactics and demanding a timely response prior
to the new hearing scheduled for September 27. The defendants' first
W. LAUTERBACH, & P. HARTMANN, supra note 55, t1berskht ror § 253 Anm. 2(B)
(relegate the principle to a presumption); R. BRUNS, ZIVILPROZESSRECHIT 109 (2d ed. 1978)
and G. VON CRAUSHAAR, supra note 108, at 106 (refer under this heading only to the effect
that allegations made in earlier hearings need not be repeated in later ones). The principle's
converse is called the Eventualmaxime, or "just-in-case principle," which calls for the presentation of all even conditionally or potentially relevant allegations as early as possible. The
Eveniualmaxime is associated with the pre-Code common law procedure, and carries a negative emotional burden in many theoretical discussions about procedure. See J. ScHULr,
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER EVENTUALMAXIMEpassim (1980).
160. ZPO § 296a (1977). This has been characterized by the legislative draftsman as an
expression of the duty to expedite. BUNDESTAG DRUCKSACHE 712729,sipra note 110, at 76.
161. ZPO § 279 1 (1950).
162. Id
163. Id § 279a.
164. Judgment of May 8, 1973, OLG K?31n, 26 NJW 1847.
BACH,
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substantive response to the complaint was delivered at the September
27 hearing. The Landgericht rejected the response as untimely. In sustaining this ruling on appeal, the Oberlandesgericht held that if the
plaintiff was unable to respond f9 the defenses on the spot, it was
within the Landgerichl'sdiscretion either to reset the hearing, allow the
plaintiff time after the hearing to respond in writing, or to preclude the
defenses under former section 279. A prior ruling of the appellate
court, to the effect that preclusion was never proper at least as long as
the second alternative was feasible, was abandoned. Less than a year
later, however, the same Oberlandesgericht held that neither special
pre-hearing deadlines nor the statutory requirement that writings be
served one week before hearing could support preclusion at the first
hearing, absent extraordinary circumstances.165
Under the 1977 amendments, the general preclusion provision,
section 296,166 defines two categories of situations in which preclusion
of late material is not discretionary, but presumptive; that is, the material must be precluded unless the offering party satisfies the court that
certain conditions are fulfilled. Material which was subject to a specific
deadline may be accepted late only if the court is persuaded either that
admission will not delay the proceedings or that the party's delay is
adequately excused.' 67 Waivable dilatory defenses may be accepted
late only if the delay is adequately excused. 6 ' The former standard,
165. Judgment of Jan. 30, 1973, OLG Kbln, 1973 ENTSCHEIDUNOEN DER OBER[OLGZ] 365. See also Judgment of Mar. 19, 1959, Kammergericht [KG] Berlin, 12 NJW 1736. On the slight use of preclusion under the prior law,
see generally Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 1, at 1218-19; BERICIT DER KOMLANDESGERICHTE IN ZIVILSACHEN

1977, supra note 2, at 53.
166. ZPO § 296 (1977). Section 296 provides in full:
I. Material in support of claims or defenses, which are first presented after expiration of a deadline fixed for them (§ 273 II 1, § 275 I 1,III, IV, § 276 1 2, III, § 277),
are only admissible if the court is persuaded that disposition of the case would not
be delayed or if the party has adequately excused the tardiness.
II. Material in support of claims or defenses, which were not timely presented in
accordance with § 282 1 or not timely transmitted in accordance with § 282 II, may
be rejected, if the court is persuaded that their admission would delay disposition
of the case or that the untimeliness is attributable to gross negligence.
III. Untimely objections which go to the permissibility of the complaint and
which are waivable may only be admitted if the defendant adequately excuses the
untimeliness.
IV. In the case of paragraphs I and III the basis of excuse shall, on demand of the
court, be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
167. Id § 296 I.
168. Id § 296 III. The defenses referred to here are principally (a) the defense of improper venue, which must be asserted at first instance before any argument to the merits,
ZPO § 397; (b) the defense that the dispute is subject to agreement to arbitrate; (c) the deMISSION
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discretionary preclusion if the court is persuaded that admission would
delay the proceedings and that the tardiness resulted from gross negligence, remains for violations of the general obligation to expedite.

69

With the introduction of these provisions, preclusion, though of
course exceptional, is no longer rare. The number of published deci-

sions dealing with various issues of preclusion has increased significantly.!7" The most important of these issues are the concept of
"delay," the extent to which the court is required to take preparatory

measures to avoid delay, and the concept of "adequate excuse."
a. Delay
The concept of delay suggests a comparison of circumstances, and
one of the questions which most frequently arose in the first years after
the 1977 reform was that of choosing the standard against which the
time consumed by admission of the late material should be measured.
A number of courts and writers took the position that inappropriate
delay occurs when the case will take longer after admitting the late
material than it would have if the material had been offered on timeoften called the "hypothetical delay" standard.' 7 1 Others argued that
the basis for comparison should be the circumstances which would obtain if the late material were simply rejected--called the "absolute delay" standard. 7 u Such pre-1977 authority as existed supported the
"absolute delay" standard, 73 and the Federal Supreme Court has con74
sistently taken that position.'
fense of failure to pay costs of an earlier proceeding; and (d) that of failure to provide
security for costs in the present proceeding. A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACIt, & P. HARTMANN, supra note 55, ZPO § 282 Anm. 5.
169. ZPO § 296 11 (1977).
170. See, ag., Deubner, Die Fraxis der Zuriackvenieisung rerspaleten Vorbringens. 32
NJW 337 (1979). A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH, & P. HARTMANN, supra note 55. ZPO
§ 296 contains five large-format pages of commentary citing dozens of post-1977 cases.
171. In particular, H. THOMAS & H. Purzo, ZPO § 297 Anm. 2(a) (1 th ed. 1981) (with
further references); Leipold, Frozessforderungspiichtder Pariienund richterliche Verantwortung, 93 ZZP 237, 249-50 (1980); Schneider,Anmerkung, 33 NJW 947 (1980); Judgment of
June 23, 1978, OLG Frankfurt, 32 NJW 375; Judgment of Mar. 8, 1979, OLG Frankfurt. 32
NJW 1715; Judgment of Mar. 7, 1979, OLG Hamburg, 32 NJW 1717; Judgment of Feb. 20,
1979, OLG Hamm, 32 NJW 1717.
172. See, eg., A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH & P. HARTMANN, supra note 55. ZPO
§ 296 Anm. 2Ca; Deubner, Zurilckverweisung verspateten Vorbringens nach der Verelnfachungsnovelle, 30 NJW 921, 923 (1977).
173. Judgment of Feb. 7, 1974, Bundesgerichtshof, 27 NJW 842; F. STEIN, M. JONAS, E
SCHUMANN, & D. LEIPOLD, supra note 147, § 279 Anm. II1 b.
174. Judgment of Jan. 31, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof. 76 BGHZ 133; Judgment of July 12,
1979, Bundesgerichtshof, 75 BGHZ 138; WalchshOfer, 93 ZZP 184 (1980) (note to last
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Applying the absolute delay theory, the Bundesgerich/shof (Federal Supreme Court) has sustained a lower court's preclusion of a defendant's answer, where the latter missed a deadline prior to the early
first hearing but did answer the day before, and where the early first
hearing itself failed to produce a settlement or to resolve disputed issues. 175 The Court rejected the argument that the holding of a principal hearing as such can never constitute delay, finding rather that the
early first hearing was intended by the legislature not merely to prepare
176
for final hearing but also to achieve disposition where feasible.
The "absolute delay" standard is not necessarily friendly to preclusion. When the court sets a deadline for an answer prior to an early
first hearing and the defendant fails to meet it, the defendant may seek
to avoid the preclusion by failing to appear at the hearing itself, and
then enter objection against the resulting default judgment. Since there
must be a hearing on the objection 177 and since the objection must state
the defenses which will be asserted on the merits, 171 it is likely that
appropriate preparatory measures prior to the post-default hearing will
permit final disposition without precluding the defenses. Under the
"absolute delay" standard, there would then be no delay, and the court
could not preclude the admission of material. The Federal Supreme
Court so held in 1980,179 after lower courts and several writers had
taken the position that such an "escape by default" is inconsistent with
the purpose of the 1977 reform. 8 ' At the same time, the Federal
Supreme Court made it clear that the late defenses are admissible only
to the extent that they can be dealt with in the same hearing, stating
that "the applicable law accepts the delay produced by the default pronamed case); Deubner, Die Praxis der Zurlckverweisung verspateten Vorbringens, 32 NJW
337, 339 (1979).
175. Judgment of Dec. 2, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, 36 NJW 575.
176. Cf. Deubner, Die Zurtickweisungfristwidrigen Vorbringens imfrhen ersten Tern/n,
36 NJW 1026 (1983), who argues that this decision constitutes "overacceleration," and that
the delay involved in setting and holding a principal hearing which would have been required if the answer had been timely should be regarded as immaterial.
177. ZPO § 341a (1977).
178. Id § 340 III.
179. Judgment of Feb. 27, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof, 76 BGHZ 173. See also Judgment
of July 4, 1979, OLG Saarbricken, 33 MDR 1030, which found error in the preclusion of
defendant's material at the early first hearing, where defendant had missed a pre-hearing
deadline, where judgment was to be handed down at a later date anyway, and where the
court could have set a final hearing for both proof-taking and judgment.
180. See Judgment of July 14, 1978, OLG Zweibrticken, 33 MDR 321; Judgment of Dec.
1, 1978, LG Berlin, 33 MDR 321; Judgment of Aug. 2, 1978, LG Mtlnster, 31 NJW 2558;
Hartmann, supra note 117, at 1463; Franzki, supra note 109, at 13.
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cedure itself."' 8

1

Admission of the late material, however, must not

cause additional delay."8 2
When the issue is not multiplication of hearings, but merely ex-

tending the amount of time spent at a single hearing, the cases suggest a
strong presumption against a finding of delay. Thus, the fact that one
or two witnesses would have to be examined at the hearing has been
held insufficient for a finding of delay, where the scope of examination

would be narrow and there would be a full opportunity to respond to
such proof at the hearing. t 3 Moreover, the Federal Supreme Court
has held that delayed "disposition of the case" (Erled'ungdes Rechisst-

reits) means delay of the entire case, so that where late material relates
to a separable part of the claim which upon preclusion can be disposed
of by partial judgment, but the remainder of the claim or claims 'will
require further hearings, there would be no delay within the meaning

of the statute and preclusion is improper. t 84 On the other hand, where
a7 necessary hearing which ought to be set "as soon as possible" would

have to be set substantially later to accommodate a late offer of proof,
the Federal Supreme Court has held that preclusion would be
85

proper.1
b.

ContributoryError by the Court

A number of cases have dealt with the question of whether failure
by the court to fulfill its duties constitutes a barrier to preclusion. In
general, it is held that where reasonable preparatory measures under
section 273 can preent delay, the court must undertake to do so before
precluding late material. t86 Preclusion was thus held improper where
181. Judgment of Feb. 27, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof, 76 BGHZ 173, 177.
182. See Deubner, supra note 174, at 342; Schneider, Einspruch gegen Versdumnirurteil
nach Fristversaumung,33 MDR 710; cf Hoyer, Conmnent, JZ 615, 617 (1980) (arguing that
§ 296 I no longer applies to material which could have been presented before default, only
the objection-to-default provisions themselves).
183. Judgment of Mar. 25, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof, 33 NJW 1848.
184. Judgment of June 16, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof, 77 BGHZ 306: see the critical note
by Deubner, 33 NJW 2356 (1980), who argues that the provision for partial judgments. ZPO
§ 301, itself expresses a policy of expedition and implies separability of claims for preclusion
purposes as well. Cf. Judgment of June 6, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof, 34 MDR 50 (an interlocutory judgment under ZPO § 304 on liability may sustain preclusion). This case was
distinguished in the 1980 decision as affecting the entire claim whereas the partial judgment
does not.
185. Judgment of Oct. 23, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof, 34 NJW 286 (alternative ground).
Cf. Judgment of Oct. 30, 1979, OLG Milnchen, 34 MDR 148 (holding that a delayed date
for udgment, to make room for a written post-hearing exchange on material tardily introduced at the hearing, was not such a delay as to justify preclusion).
186. See, ag., Judgment of May 22, 1979, BVerfG, 51 BVerfGE 188, 192.
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the court, after receiving a late memorandum offering proof of a defense, failed to direct the production of the proof and the personal appearance of other parties at a hearing already set for six weeks later,
and where the defense could have been considered on the merits without delay. 87 It has been held unreasonable, however, to require the
court to subpoena eight witnesses to appear at the first appellate hearing, where those witnesses ought to have been offered at first instance, 188 or to require the court to take special measures to reach a
witness rather than rely on the mails, 189 even though in either case the
court might have succeeded in avoiding the delay.
It is clear that any formal defect in the setting or notification of
deadlines will bar preclusion of late material. This includes cases in
which the order served on the defendant setting a deadline is signed by
the clerk rather than the presiding judge, 190 or is informally communicated rather than formally served,' 9 1 or fixes the earliest permissible
date despite evidence before the court that the defendant may not actually know about the pendency of the lawsuit,192 or the clerk uses a notice of early first hearing form to notify the unrepresented and still
silent defendant of the date for a final hearing after written pretrial
93
procedure. 1
c. Excuse

Preclusion of late material can also be escaped by excusing the
delay. In this respect, the major change effected by the 1977 reform
was to establish ordinary negligence or fault as the standard for preclusion of material subject to a fixed deadline, while the former standard
of gross negligence remains for material subject only to the general
duty to expedite.'
The failure of an attorney, at least, to meet a fixed
deadline is presumptively negligent. 19 There are few published deci187. Judgment of July 10, 1978, KG Berlin, 32 NJW 1369.
188. Judgment of Nov. 29, 1978, OLG Koblenz, 32 NJW 374.
189. Judgment of Feb. 13, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof, 33 NJW 1102; see the comment by
Schneider, 34 MDR 488 (1980).
190. Judgment of Oct. 23, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof, 34 NJW 286 (alternative ground),
Judgment of Apr. 4, 1980, 34 MDR 749; Judgment of Mar. 3, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof, 76
BGHZ 236.
191. Judgment of Feb. 7, 1979, OLG Frankfurt, 33 MDR 764.
192. Judgment of May 23, 1979, OLG Koln, 33 NJW 2421.
193. Judgment of Jan. 12, 1979, OLG Oldenburg, 33 NJW 295.
194. ZPO § 296 III (1977).
195. See A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH, & P. HARTMANN. supra note 55. ZPO § 296
Anm. 1.
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sions in which the adequacy of any excuse is discussed.' 9 6 It has been
held that the failure of the defendant to hire a lawyer in time19 7 or to

tell the lawyer soon enough about particular defenses' 9 8 were not sufficient excuses, while the fact that the defendant's regular attorney was
on vacation at the time of service and did not return until too late to
meet a deadline has been held to be a sufficient excuse. 199 There have

been many complaints that the forms of court notice, which require the
addressee to check one or more of a number of boxes, are confusing
and inadequately inform the party about what is required. While such

an excuse may be more forceful inpro se cases than in attorney-represented cases, its chances are slim in any event.2 00
Finally, the ambivalence of the courts toward preclusion of late
material can be observed in their answers to two further questions.
First, it is firmly established that erroneous admission of late material is

not reviewable on appeal, and that appellate courts cannot ignore evidence which has been erroneously admitted below. It is argued that the

sole purpose of the preclusion rules is to expedite the lawsuit, and that
that purpose cannot be accomplished either by remand to the court of

first instance or by ignoring on appeal that which has already formed
the basis ofjudgment z1 t Second, the preclusion rules are a direct limitation on the constitutional right to be heard, which has been inter-

preted as including the right to have one's properly presented offerings
actually considered.2 0

Every erroneous preclusion of relevant mate-

196. ZPO § 85 II makes it clear that negligence of an attorney is attributable to the client.
But courts are not always unmindful of the reality behind that rule--that clients frequently
have little control over their counsel and have difficulty even selecting one on an informed
basis---and may try to avoid preclusion on that account. For a critical discussion of the rule,
see Leipold, supra note 171, at 254. See infra for the nonreviewability of an improper admission of delayed material.
197. See Judgment of Dec. 1, 1977, OLG Paderborn, 31 NJW 381.
198. This excuse was rejected in a case which I observed in the Landgerkht Freiburg,
May 20, 1981, where the client admitted he had known all along that there was evidence
available to help establish a particular point, but had not bothered to tell his lawyer until the
hearing itself.
199. Judgment of May 23, 1979, OLG Koln, 33 NJW 2421.
200. Cf. Judgment of Feb. 13, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof, 33 NJW 1102, and the note to
this decision by Schneider, supra note 189, at 499 (the excuse itself was rejected because it
was late). The criticism of forms is also voiced strongly by Franzki, supra note 109, at 11.
201. Judgment of Jan. 21, 1981, Bundesgerichtshof, 34 NJW 928. Cq Deubner, Comment, 34 NJW 929 (1981) (arguing that the court's ruling on this point was unnecessary).
See also Judgment of June 4, 1980, OLG Kon, 33 NJW 2361; Judgment of July 19, 1979,
LG Freiburg, 33 MDR 1030. Under the prior law as well, an appellate court could not
preclude material accepted at trial level Judgment of Nov. 12, 1959, Bundesgerichtshof, 13
NJW 100.
202. See F. STEIN, M. JONAS, & E. SCHUMANN, supra note 66, at 275; Judgment of Feb.
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rial, therefore, presents a potential federal constitutional issue, and the
Federal Constitutional Court has handed down a few decisions which
suggest that a simple error in applying the preclusion rules may be basis for constitutional review. 20 3 The proposition has been criticized
both as undermining the effectiveness of the reforms and as an undue
burden on the Federal Constitutional Court itself.2°4 The latest Federal Constitutional Court pronouncement on the subject indicates future caution. 2 5 Nonetheless, the issue emphasizes the great seriousness
with which the West German Court system takes procedure's primary
goal of rendering a materially correct decision. z°
4. Other Sanctions for Delay
Under the prior law, section 278 11207 provided for a cost sanction
to be imposed upon the offering of late material, defined as that which
1, 1978, 47 BVerfG 182 (Ist Sen.). In pre-reform decisions, the Constitutional Court had
made it clear that preclusion on procedural grounds was notperse unconstitutional, but that
a clearly erroneous application of preclusion rules would be. See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 10,
1973, BVerfG, 36 BVerfGE 92 (2d Sen.), where material was properly offered but ignored at
the trial level, then properly reoffered on appeal, but the appellate court rejected it as having
been offered for the first time on appeal. This error was held to violate article 103 of the
Basic Law, ie., the right to be heard.
203. The First Senate has appeared to distinguish between a lower court's erroneous
interpretation of the preclusion provisions, and its erroneous application thereof. The former
is properly a matter for the regular courts and does not rise to the level of constitutional
violation. Judgment of Mar. 12, 1979, BVerfG (Ist Sen.), 32 NJW 277. The latter, however,
constitutes aperse violation of the right to be heard, Judgment of May 22, 1979, BVerfG, 51
BVerfGE 188 (1st Sen.); Judgment of Feb. 9, 1982, BVerfG, 35 NJW 1453 (1st Sen.) (improper to preclude for violation of a deadline, where the order fixing the deadline was unclear). Its latest decision, however, may even have abandoned that distinction. The court
found that the interlocutory review procedure of the ZPO (Beschwerde) expressly rejects
preclusion of late material, and that therefore erroneous preclusion on interlocutory review
constituted a violation of the right to be heard. Judgment of Feb. 9, 1982, BVerfG, 35 NJW
1635 (1st Sen.). Such an interpretation of the ZPO § 570, however, had been rejected in
most prior decisions of the regular courts. See Schumann, Kelne Pri)kluson in
Beschwerdeverfahren: Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als Bundesgerichtshof, 35 NJW 1609
(1982).
204. See Schumann, supra note 203, at 1610; Deubner, Comment, 33 NJW 1945 (1980),
For a detailed and comprehensive critique of the Constitutional Court's failure to distinguish between constitutional and nonconstitutional standards, see Schumann, Bundesverfas,
sungsgericht, Grundgesetz und Ziviprozess, 96 ZZP 138 (1983).
205. Judgment of Apr. 22, 1980, BVerfG, 54 BVerfGE 117, 33 NJW 1737 (2d Sen.). On
the issue generally, see Fisch, supra note 66. See supra text accompanying notes 111-17,
206. See, e.g., Bettermann, supra note 7, at 379; Bruns, Die Frist als gesetzgeberisches
Mittel der deutschen Ziviprozessreform zur Beschleunigung der Ven/ahren, in STUDI IN
ONORE DI E.T. LIEBMANN 123, 130 (1979). On the profusion and confusion of mechanisms
for correcting judicial error in Germany, see Gilles, Die Berufung in Zivilsachen und die
zivilgerichtliche Instanzenordnung,in HUMANE JUSTIZ 147 (P. Gilles ed. 1977).
207. ZPO § 278 11 (1950).
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ought to have been presented at a previous hearing (nachtraglichesVorbringen). The court was thus required to impose on a party the costs
caused by his delay. It is not at all clear how often this sanction was
utilized although some costs of delay-such as having to continue the
hearing to another date or changing a judgment date into a date for
proof-taking 2 8-- might be relatively easily fixed. 209 The difficulties of
proving the cost of delay, however, could be avoided by the use of a
fixed "delay penalty," utilizing the regular court fee structure based on
the amount in controversy.210 Cost burdens were also the chief sanction behind the default judgment, which was otherwise so easy to
21
reopen. '
The initial successes of the Stuttgart Model were achieved through
the use of such cost sanctions as reinforcement for the undoubtedly
more important sheer effort of the judges to adhere to schedules and
drive the parties and the lawsuit to a conclusion. For this reason, the
chief architect and implementer of the Model argued against the introduction of sharper preclusion rules as sanctions for delay. 12 Procedural sanctions are adequate if properly used, it was maintained, and
preclusion of material produces an unacceptably false factual basis for
decision.213
From its first draft in 1967, however, the Civil Procedure Commission took the position that cost sanctions alone were inappropriate or
inadequate and that preclusion was the most promising sanction
against delay, although the basis for this argument shifted from the
208. Cf. F. STEIN, M. JONAS, E. SCHUMANN & D. LEIPOLD, .slpra note 147, § 278 Anm.
2B. See also ZPO § 95 (1950), permitting imposition of costs for any delay caused by a
party's fault.
209. A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH, & P. HARTMANN, supra note 55, ZPO § 95 Anm.
2 (pointing out that the provision, which includes all cases to which § 278 11 would apply,
has little significance in practice, precisely because the amounts involved are often negligible
or simply inseparable from general costs). Accord Deubner, Gedanken zur ichterlichen,4ufkidrungs und Hinweispflicht, 79 FEsTscHmiFr FOR GERHARD SCHIEDER.wEIR 79, 88 n.13
(1976).
210. Gerichtskostengesetz [GKG] § 34 (1975) (formerly § 47 (1957)). See A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH & P. HARTMANN, supra note 55, at 234 (noting that even this provision is too little used).
211. ZPO § 344 (1950).
212. See Bender, supra note 23, at 442-44.
213. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. The main criticism of the preclusion
provisions in the first draft of the reform proposal was of this character. See St~ltter, Lange
Prozessdauer und iAre Ursachen, 22 NJW 521 (1968); Deutscher Anwaltsverein, Stellungnahme, 1968 AnwB1 354. Cf. Leipold, supra note 171, who argues that the chief defect
of the preclusion device is its authoritarian character.
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divisiveness of cost sanctions 214 to their discriminatory and ineffective
nature.215 The express cost sanction in the provision dealing with late
offerings of proof was therefore eliminated. Nonetheless, the general
cost sanctions for delay remain.216 Since the general cost provisions
apply to any delay caused by a party's fault, and not merely to situations where preclusion would be mandatory under section 296 I, they
could still be useful.
E. The Principal Hearing and the Role of the Judge
The effort to overcome the traditional diffusion of the lawsuit into
multiple hearings by concentrating as much as possible into a single,
comprehensively prepared hearing required a broad statutory blueprint
for the principal hearing. This is provided by new ZPO section 278,217
which, in combination with section 137,218 presents the following
9
21

model:

(a) call of the case and identification of participants present;
(b) introduction and statement of the case by the judge or presiding
judge;

(c) response of the parties, if any, to that statement;

(d) discussion of the case among court and parties and/or
attorneys;
(e) proof-taking;
(f) further discussion and argument with reference to the results of
the proof-taking;
(g) deliberation by the court; and

(h) announcement of the judgment, or fixing of a subsequent date
for the announcement, possibly with an interim deadline for
written statements by the parties.
This model corresponds roughly to that followed by the Stuttgart
Model. The role of judicial proposals for settlement, central to the
Stuttgart Model, was also formally strengthened by the 1977 reform.
This was accomplished largely by transforming a technically permis214. BERICHT DER KoMMISSION 1961, supra note 37, at 206.
215. BUNDESTAG DRUCKSACHE 7/2729, supra note 110, at 39 (discriminates against
poorer parties); BERICHT DER KoMMISSION 1977, supra note 2, at 52 (ineffective to secure
compliance).

216. See ZPO § 95 (1950) and GKG § 34 (1975); see supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.

217. ZPO § 278 (1977).
218. Id § 137.
219. See A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH, & P. HARTMANN, supra note 55, ZPO
Anm. 1; L. ROSENBERG & K. SCHWAB, supra note 99, at 616.

§ 278
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sive provision"2 into a duty to consider settlement possibilities at every
stage of the lawsuit.2
Other than the fact that a model for a single haring is now set
forth in the statute, perhaps the only new item in the list is the required
statement of the case by the judge at the outset, although even this was
already standard practice in many courts before 1 9 7 7 .* This provision has been viewed with scorn by some writers, on the basis that, at
least in cases with counsel, the parties are already informed about the
matter.2" It is clear, however, that what was intended is a statement
from the court's point of view, including indications of how the court
views the questions of law, probable outcome, and so forth 2 4 This is
often the most important missing link in settlement discussions, and of
course, it gives the parties something to focus on during argument. The
extent to which this device is used for the purpose of disclosing the
court's thought varies from judge to judge and from case to case. ' So
used, however, it is a powerful instrument for guiding the hearing directly to the disputed points. In current terminology, this is often referred to as "legal dialogue" (Rechisgesprach). There are arguments to
the effect that open disclosure by the court of its views soon enough to
allow the parties to respond and direct their factual statements accordingly is not merely a good idea, but an obligation. 6 This form of disclosure, of course, can occur already prior to the hearing, in the form of
directions to the parties to clarify specified points.2 27 The ZPO now
also contains an express requirement that the court give the parties an
opportunity to speak before ruling on a legal basis which one or both
220. ZPO § 296 (1950).
221. ZPO § 279 (1977).
222. A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH, & P. HARTMANN, .pra note 55, ZPO § 278 Anm.

2.
223. See, eg., Bettermann, supra note 7, at 372.
224. A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH, & P. HARTMANN, supra note 55, ZPO § 278 Anm.
2; Grunskysupra note 109, at 203; Putzo, Die Vereinfachungsnovelle, 30 NJW 1,3 (1977); G.
VON CRAUSHAAR, supra note 108, at 96.
225. Franzki, supra note 109, at 11, notes that many courts simply skip this step for
reasons of time. See also L. ROSENBERG & K. SCHWAB, supra note 99, at 616. Judges with
whom I spoke in Hamburg and Freiburg who make effective use of it were at some pains to
caution me that there were many judges who were much less "open" in their hearing
techniques.
226. For a thoughtful espousal of this view, with references to the literature, see Hensen,
Zum Rechtsgespriich im Zivi/prozess, in Aus DaM HAMBURGER RECHTSLEBEN 167 (Fest-

schrift ftr W. Reimers 1979). See also R. WASSERMAN, DER SOZIALE ZIVIuPROZEss 122-23
(1978); Nagel, Funktion und Zust'ndigkeft des Richters, in HUMANE JuSTIZ 53, 58-59 (P.
Gilles ed. 1977); Deubner, supra note 209,passim.
227. ZPO § 173 11 (1977).
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parties have obviously overlooked or thought unimportant.2 28
The obligation of the court, embodied in ZPO section 139, to assure that the parties make full statements concerning the relevant facts
and make appropriate demands for relief, has remained formally unchanged since 1924.229 While it is difficult to point to a universal trend,
the new emphasis on expedition by the parties, enforced with deadlines
and preclusion, brings a corresponding focus of attention on the role of
the court in assuring that the case is as fully developed as possible.
Moreover, at least one decision of the Federal Constitutional Court
gives this judicial duty another dimension: a violation of section 139
caused by obtaining the consent of a non-represented spouse to accept
the other spouse's low bid at an execution sale without first ascertaining
that she understood the consequences was held to be a denial of equal
treatment under Article 3 of the Basic Law.2 3 °
Some recent decisions have dealt with the question of whether section 139 permits a court to bring previously overlooked claims or defenses to a party's attention. There is a split of authority on the
propriety of court initiative regarding the defense of prescription (statute of limitations).2 3 ' No doubt the traditional conception of the judicial role supports disapproval of such initiative, and would limit the
role of the court to pointing out the burdens and risks of the parties
regarding issues over which they hold the power of disposition.23 2
Contemporary notions of the welfare state (Sozialslaat) pull in the op228. Id § 278 III. For the point that this was already a constitutional requirement anyway, see Order of Mar. 27, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof, 33 NJW 1794. To that effcct, without
mentioning § 278 III, see Judgment of Oct. 7, 1980, 55 BVerfGE 95 (2d Sen.).
229. ZPO § 139 (1950). On this provision and its many facets, see Kaplan, von Mchren
& Schaefer, supra note 1, at 1224. ZPO § 139 provides in pertinent part:
I. The presiding judge shall see to it that the parties declare themselves fully on
all material facts and put the appropriate demands for relief, in particular also
supplement inadequate statements of alleged facts and designate sources of proof.
For this purpose, in so far as necessary, he shall discuss the dispute with the parties
from the factual and the legal points of view and put questions.
230. Judgment of Mar. 24, 1976, BVerfG, 41 BVerfGE 64 (2d Sen.).
231. Supporting such initiative: Judgment of Mar. 20, 1979, LG Braunschweig, 1979
NIEDERSXCHSISCHE RECHTSPFLEGE, [NdsRpfl] 146; Rogge, Comment, 56 DRiZ 266 (1978):

Schneider, Befangenheit des auf Verjdhrungsablaufhinweisenden Richters?, 33 MDR 974
(1979); Wache & Selig, Comment, 33 NJW 1170-01 (1980). Contra Judgment of Aug. 1,
1979, OLG K6ln, 33 MDR 1027; Judgment of Aug. 1, 1979, OLG Bremen, 33 NJW 2215.
232.

See, e.g., R. STORNER, AUFKLXRUNGSPFLICHT DER PARTEIEN DES ZIVILPROZESSES

64, 65 (1976). The prevailing view understands ZPO § 139 I thus as simply a duty to re-

mind, which imposes no independent clarifying task upon the judge, rather obliges him
merely to remind the parties to avoid the risk of nonsubstantiation and completely fulfill
their duty to clarify. Deubner, supra note 209, at 88, points out that judges "all too often"
simply asked counsel if they had anything more to present.
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posite direction, demanding that public authorities compensate for differences in resources among social combatants. 3 It is certainly
difficult to distinguish judicial questions designed to raise new issues
from those designed to clarify those issues imperfectly stated. Likewise, it is difficult for the court to separate its obligation of assuring
awareness of the necessity for offers of proof on disputed propositions,
from its duty to assure that appropriate demands for relief are made
concerning facts already fully alleged and proven.3 4 The specific issue
of the defense of prescription fits within the latter category if the passage of the crucial period of time is proven by the plaintiff's own allegations. Moreover, it has been held that the defense of prescription can
be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal, and cannot be
waived by mere silence nor be precluded as a late offering under section 296, because it can only work to shorten the proceedings. 35 The
public interest in efficient judicial administration therefore supports judicial initiative. Otherwise, a silent defendant can strike at any time,6
nullifying the court's preparation for other disposition of the case.2
Finally, critics have noted the irony of correcting the error by disqualifying the judge, when the newly educated defendant will surely present
the defense to a new judge. 7 The result may well be a rule, purporting to limit judicial activity, which can be relatively easily evaded by
judges so disposed, just as the command of section 139 to stimulate the
parties to clarify was apparently ignored by more passive judges.
Active pursuit of settlement by the court during the course of the
lawsuit, including formulation of concrete proposals, has long been a
staple of German civil procedure. 8 Under the prior law, in addition
to the general provision permitting the court to attempt settlement at
every stage, the Amtsgericht judge was under a duty to work toward
settlement," 9 and the preparing single judge in the Landgericht had a
233. Wache & Selig, supra note 231, at 1171:
The judge should be on guard, that no party to a lawsuit lose merely because he is
linguistically or intellectually less developed than the other, can spend less money
for pursuit of legal rights or has ended up with a less expert lawyer. Such accidental factors in legal success are, according to the rule-of-law and social-state clauses
of the Basic Law, as far as possible to be eliminated.
234. For discussion of practical problems in implementing the restrictive view, see
Schneider, supra note 231, and Deubner, supra note 209,passrim.
235. Judgment of Apr. 29, 1980, OLG Frankfurt, 35 MDR 228.
236. See Schneider, supra note 231, at 977; Deubner, supra note 209, at 87.
237. Wache & Selig, supra note 231, at 1171.
238. See Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 1, at 1222-24.
239. ZPO § 495 (1950).
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settlement attempt as the first order of business. 240 With the elimination of the preparing single judge in 1975,24 1 however, the general permissive provision was the only statutory basis for such activity in the
Landgericht. The 1977 amendment of the permissive section, current
section 279, was designed not only to close this gap, but also to foster
further assimilation of Amtsgerichl and Landgericht practice.242 The
language of section 279 suggests compromise in some respects, but it is
doubtful that significant substantive change was intended.243
There has also been a quickening of critical interest in the subject
of judicial settlement activity during the reform period. An obvious
concern, already present in theAmsgericht but perhaps emphasized by
the elimination of the preparing single judge in the Landgericht, is that
the same judges who are ultimately responsible for judgment are also
involved in settlement efforts. The question of how far the judge can
go in urging settlement without compromising either impartiality or responsibility to the substantive law is acute. In one of the most comprehensive analyses of these issues, published in 1976, :24 the position was
taken that the judge may not assist in the conclusion of a settlement
which is inconsistent with the substantive law. In particular, according
to this source, if the complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim,
the judge may not suggest or support a compromise granting the plaintiff partial relief.2 4 5 Further, the judge should not propose a settlement
favoring the party bearing the burden of persuasion, where the allocation of the burden reflects a substantive policy and it appears unlikely
that the party will be able to meet the burden.246 It was also maintained
240. Id § 348 I.
241. See supra text accompanying note 53.
242. On the goal of assimilation see, e.g., Putzo, supra note 224, at 6; A.

BAUMBACiI,

W.

LAUTERBACH, & P. HARTMANN, supra note 55, ZPO § 495 Anm. 1.

243. On the terminological subtleties, see Sttlrner, Die Aufgabe des Richters, Schiedsrichters undRechtsanwaltsbeider gailichen StreiterIedigung,33 JR 133 (1979). At least one
judge has interpreted the amendments as requiring greater emphasis on settlements, and has
reported with satisfaction a substantial shift in the mix of dispositions in his court away from
final judgments (28.9% in 1976, 14.2% in 1977) toward settlements (8.9% to 12.0%), voluntary
dismissals (12.5% to 17.7%), and acknowledgements of claim (4.5% to 9.9%). Weber, Gtiiche
Beilegungund VerhandlungsstilmZiviprozess, 56 DRiZ 166, 169 (1978). The judge emphasizes the role of judicial style at hearings in encouraging settlement, and identifies three
style-types: authoritarian, laissez-faire, and democratic, He argues that the democratic
style, utilizing direct participation of and dialogue between the parties, not their lawyers, is
best suited to promotion of settlement. The judge attributes his own success to adoption of
that style.
244. Wolf, Normative Aspeckte richterlicher Vergleichstitigkeit, 89 ZZP 260 (1976).
245. Id at 276.
246. Id at 278-79.

1983]

West German Civil Procedure

that judges should not propose a settlement disadvantaging a party to
whom the law gives special protection-such as that afforded tenants
against eviction-unless it is highly probable that a fully litigated judgment would go against that party.2 47 Other writers, as well, have
viewed judicial drive toward settlement as potentially dangerous to
substantive interests,2 48 especially because the structure of attorneys'
fees, which are based generally on the amount in controversy rather
than on the amount of work done, provides a strong incentive to settle.249 In addition, sociological studies have attempted to identify the
conditions under which formal settlement can be achieved, the factors
which influence the success of formal settlement in ending the underlying dispute, the advantages and disadvantages of settlement over coercive judgment, and so on. 50
With all of this attention on settlement in the literature, it is interesting to note that the relative frequency of settlements as against fully
litigated judgments has slightly decreased nationally in the course of
the 1970's,211 and remains considerably lower than comparable figures
247. I at 280.
248. R. STURNER, Supra note 232 at 135; Grunsky, Die gtliche Beilegung von Rechtsstreitigkeiten, in DEUTSCHE LNDERBERICHTE ZUM IX. INTERNATIONALEN KONGRESS FOR

158, 167 (1978); Ekelf, Gltever.ruch und Sch/ichtung, in
GEDXCHTNISSCHRIFT FUR RUDOLF BRUNS 3 (J. Baltzer, G. Baumglrtel, E. Peters, H.
Pieper eds. 1980).
249. See Grunsky, supra note 248, at 168.
250. See Rbhl, Der Vergleich im Ziviiprozess-Einei41ternati'ezum Urteil? in ALTERNARECHTSVERGLEICHUNG

TIVE RECHTSFORMEN UND ALTERNATIVEN ZUM RECHT (JahrbuchftrRechisso.iologie und

Rechistheorie vol. 6) 279 (1980); E. BLANKENBURG & J. FIEDLER, DIE RECHTSSCHUTZVERSICHERUNGEN UND DER STEIGENDE GESCHXFTSANFALL DER GERCISTE 96-100

(1981) (on the reputed reluctance of legal expense insurers to settle); M. ADAMS, OKONOMIsCHE ANALYSE DES ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS 9-25 (1981) (economic analysis of settlement
readiness).
251. Rohl, supra note 250, at 283, shows that from 1970 to 1976 the percentage of dispositions of ordinary civil cases in the rAtsgericht attributable to settlement remained fairly
constant at about 10% and in the Landgericht at about 19%. The percentage attributable to
contested judgment, on the other hand, rose in theArn4sgericht from 19% to 30% while varying between 30% and 34% in the Landgericht. Official data in REcHrSPFLEGE, tables 3.2 and
4.3, show little change from 1977 to 1980. By 1981, (tables 4.2 and 5.3), settlements were
down to 9.5% in the Ainsgericht and 17.1% in the Landgericht, counterbalanced somewhat
in the latter courts by a rise in default judgments (which can reflect de facto settlement!)
from 16.9% to 19.3%. Of course, the figures for particular courts may vary dramatically.
See, eg., Weber, supra note 243.
One reason for this stagnation in the relative proportion ofsettlements may be their cost
treatment. Once a case has proceeded to formal hearing and proof-taking, it may be more
expensive to settle than to allow the court to proceed to judgment. In such a situation,
settlement will save the court fees payable for rendition of a judgment, but will add a much
larger fee payable to the attorneys which is not payable for the judgment. See
BundesgebthrenordnungfarRechtsanwalte [BRAGO] § 23 (attorneys' fee for settlement):
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in American experience,2 5 2 where judicial pressure towards settlement
tends to be less obtrusive.

V.
A.

THE SCOPE AND FORM OF APPEAL

First Appeal: Berufung

1. Two Fact-Instances
From the American point of view, the most striking aspect of the
German Berufung is that it is not limited to questions of law, or even to
the record developed below, but opens up the entire dispute for redetermination to the extent requested by the parties. In the traditional view,

appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding, part of the "unity of

oral argument. 2 5 3 This means, on the one hand, that the record below

is part of the appellate proceeding, and need not be regenerated in order to be relied upon by the appellate court. On the other hand, the
appellate court is free to reexamine the witnesses who testified in the
proceeding below, reevaluate the documentary evidence offered below,
and entertain new allegations and evidence.2 5 4 This freedom to reopen
cases on appeal, as originally adopted in 1877, soon led to the common

experience of lawsuits in which the trial at first instance was only an
inadequately prepared and incompletely presented prelude to the real
GKG Annex 1, No. 1016 (fee for judgment). For general discussion of the developments in
costs and fees, see infra section V of the text.
252. It is usually asserted that more than 90% of civil cases in the United States arc
ultimately settled by agreement of the parties. See, e.g., Nejelski, With Justice Affordablefor
All, 19 JUDGES' J. 4, 7 (1980). In 1980, in the federal district courts, only 6.5% of civil cases
reached trial, and 44.5% were disposed of without any court action-these figures showing a
decreasing and increasing trend, respectively, since 1969. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TIlE
UNITED STATES COURT, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 80, table 34 (1980). The category of "contested judgments," however, is broader than fully tried cases; it has been estimated that 38% of all civil dispositions in federal courts in 1970 were "contested cases" (up
from 18% in 1960). See Hurst, The Functions of Courts in the United States 1960-1980, 15
LAW & Soc. REv. 401, 426 (1980-81). In view of the concentration of cases of higher
amounts in controversy in the federal courts, that figure would certainly be lower in any
state court system. In two California counties in 1970 less than 15% of civil dispositions
were "contested judgments:" Friedman & Percival, A Tale of Two Courts." Litigation In
Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 267, 284-85 (1976).
253. ZPO § 515 (1950) provides: "Before the appellate court, within the limits of the
parties' demands, the dispute is argued de noyo." See also L. ROSENBERG & K. ScitwAa,
supra note 99, at 850.
254. ZPO § 537 (1950) provides: "The subject matter of argument and decision in the
appellate court is all disputed points relevant to a claim sustained or rejected below, with
respect to which the parties' demands on appeal require argument and decision, even if these
points were not argued or decided below." See L. ROSENBERG & K. SCtlWAB, supra note 99,
at 850.
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trial on appeal.25By the time of the first major overhaul of German general civil
procedure in 1924, the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure had eliminated the second fact-instance altogether, limiting appeals to inquiry
into errors of the court below." 6 Nonetheless, the 1924 German reforms rejected this aspect of the Austrian model, preferring to discourage delay by introducing new preclusion rules, which were further
strengthened in 1933. New matter in support of or in defense of a
claim, which could have been offered below and whose consideration
would delay conclusion of the lawsuit on appeal, could be entertained
by the appellate court only if it determined that neither intent to delay
nor gross
negligence caused the failure to present the material
25 -7
earlier.

The measure proved to be relatively ineffective. The Preparatory
Commission found that over twenty-five percent of all contested judgments at first instance were appealed, that more than one-third of all
appeals were successful, and that perhaps one-fourth of all successful
appeals were attributable to new allegations or proofs."5 These facts
were perceived to be evidence of unacceptable delay, and the Commission considered a number of alternative remedies designed to push the
center of gravity of the lawsuit back to the first instance. Again, both
limitation of appeal to questions of law and the Austrian example of
review for error below were discussed and rejected. In particular, the
Commission's majority saw two undesirable effects of limiting appeals
to a review of questions of law: first, the job of the appellate court
would be more complicated, by reason of greater concern for the procedural behavior of the court below; and second, the court of first instance would proceed in a more formal manner, in order to avoid being
found in error on appeal. 9 Similar objections prevailed against the
proposal to follow the Austrian example. The German and French tradition of two fact-instances, on the other hand, was seen as favoring the
most thorough factual determinations
and embodying the least obses260
sion with procedural technicalities.

The Commission therefore recommended strengthening the rules
of preclusion, so as to discourage the practice of holding back materials
255. See BUNDESTAG DRUCKSACHE 7/2729, supra note 110, at 40-41 (1974).
256. See BERICHT DER KoMissION 1961, supra note 37, at 128.
257. ZPO § 529 I (1933).
258. BERICHT DER KOMMISSION 196 1, supra note 37, at 119.
259. Id at 127-28.
260. Id at 131.
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until appeal. By the time the Commission for Civil Procedure Law
presented its proposed amendments, it was able to state that the decision to retain the second fact-instance was no longer challenged. 26'
2. New Preclusion Rules
The new preclusion rules for appeals largely track the changes instituted for the courts of first instance. The latter are incorporated by
reference in ZPO section 527,262 to govern failure in meeting the deadlines imposed by the appellate procedure itself. The core of the reform,
however, is a revised provision, now section 528,263 for the handling of
new material. Section 528 divides material into three categories, each
with a different standard for preclusion. If the material was subject
below to a specific deadline but not presented, it is precluded on appeal
261. BERICHT DER KoMMISSION 1977, supra note 2, at 163. No doubt as corollary to this
conception of appeal the availability of new trial at first instance is quite limited. Before
judgment, the court has the discretionary power to reopen a hearing which has been concluded pursuant to ZPO § 156. While exercise of this power has been relatively liberal in
the case of newly discovered evidence, the court is obligated to reopen a hearing only if it is
shown that the court itself failed to fulfill its duty to clarify under ZPO § 139. In other
words, the court must reopen only if it ought to have made further inquiry on the basis of
what had already been presented. See Judgment of Feb. 17, 1970, Bundesgcrichtshof, 53
BGHZ 245; L. ROSENBERG & K. SCHWAB, supra note 99, at 618. After judgment, a case

may be reopened in the same instance only under narrowly specified circumstances, ZPO
§§ 578-80, which are: when the court was improperly constituted; when a judge was subject
to disqualification; when a party was improperly represented without its consent, ZPO § 579;
where the judgment was based on perjured or falsified evidence; or where the judgment was
obtained as a result of misconduct on the part of attorneys, judges or the winning party,
ZPO § 580. Aside from these fundamentally tainted circumstances, only two sorts of newly
discovered material can afford a basis for reopening a hearing, ZPO § 580(7): a previous
judgment or award which would have bound the parties in the subsequent action, or a previously unknown or unproveable document which would have produced a more favorable
judgment for the moving party. Less than .1%of all cases filed in the Landgerichl, and
scarcely .1% in the Oberlandesgericht, are petitions for reopening of judgments, See
RECHTSPFLEGE, supra note 130, tables 5.1 and 8.1 (1980). None of these grounds, of course,
is comparable to new trials in the United States based on the weight of the evidence.
Also unchanged by the reform are the longstanding provisions for reversal and remand
to the court of first instance as a remedy on appeal. ZMi/prozessordnung § 538 requires remand for further proceedings, if the judgment below erroneously: rejected a defense as
legally impermissible, rested solely on procedural defenses, rested on denial of liability without reaching contested damages issues, or rested on default. Section 539 permits remand
where the proceedings at first instance suffered from essential procedural error. Section 540,
however, goes on to provide that the appellate court may forego remand and render a decision itself, if it deems that procedure to be more appropriate for that particular case, This
remedy of remand, which is the normal disposition for correction of error below in systems
where appeal is limited to review of the record, is used in a little over 10% of all successful
appeals in Germany. See RECHTSPFLEGE, supra note 130, table 8.7 (1981).
262. ZPO § 527 (1977).
263. Id § 528.
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unless the offering party shows either that admission would not delay
disposition of the lawsuit, or that there is sufficient excuse for the omission.2 6" If the failure to offer the material below violates the general
duty to expedite the proceedings,2 6 5 it is precluded unless the offering

party shows either that admission would not delay disposition of the
lawsuit or that the omission below was not grossly negligent. 266 If the
material was offered below but properly excluded, it remains excluded
on appeal whether or not its admission there would cause delay.2 67

These provisions have presented a number of problems of interpretation, the most troublesome of which stems from the difference in
treatment between material offered for the first time on appeal and that

which was offered but rejected below. If material is offered for the first
time on appeal which should have been offered below, a showing that

admission will not delay the proceedings will allow it to be considered.
The normal procedure on appeal is a written, pre-hearing exchange followed by a single hearing. Since the courts have held that there is no
delay if the matter can be handled at a hearing which must be held
anyway, 268 such a showing can usually be made, even if late admission
of the material would have delayed the proceedings below. On the
other hand, if the material was actually offered below but properly pre-

cluded as untimely, it will not help to show that admission on appeal
will not delay disposition at that level. The obvious practical result of
this differentiation is to encourage the party with late material at first
instance to save it for appeal, a result which contradicts the goal of
concentration.2 6 9
264. Id § 528 1.
265. Id § 528 Illd (ii).
266. Id § 528 II.
267. Id § 528 Il1.
268. See id § 528 Illd (iii)(A).
269. See, eg., Hartmann, supra note 117, at 1463; compare this "escape by appeal" with
the "escape by default" allowed at first instance. See.upra text accompanying notes 179-80.
To the extent that the tactic is successful, however, ZPO § 97 II may require some
portion of the costs of appeal to be imposed on the winning party. Under that provision, the
court must tax the costs of an appeal to the winning party "in whole or in part," where the
party's victory on appeal rests on new material which that party was in a position, and had
occasion, to present below. It is not clear how often or how effectively this sanction is employed, since reported decisions applying it are infrequent. It has been held that it does not
apply where the proof-taking which produced the victory was ordered by the appellate court
on its own motion, rather than on the basis of an offer by the winning party. Judgment of
Mar. 14, 1980, OLG Karlsruhe, 80 OLGZ 384. At least one lower court has held, moreover,
that it does not apply where it appears that, even if the appellant presented the defense
below, the other side would have appealed anyway. Judgment of Jan. 30, 1979, OLG
Hamm, 1979 GEWERBLICHER RECHrSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERPcCUr

[GRUR] 326.

The other major risk in the tactic, of course, is that any delay in the appellate proceed-
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It was hoped by some that this inconsistency could be eliminated
by constitutional objection, on the ground that the provision violates
the equal treatment clause of Article 3 of the Basic Law. That hope has

now been dashed by the Federal Constitutional Court. 270 The provision
does not discriminate between different persons similarly situated, according to the Court, but rather between the same person in different
procedural situations. Section 528 III, nonetheless, represents a legitimate effort to reinforce concentration of fact determination by making
preclusion orders binding on the appellate courts, while avoiding the
technicality of precluding all material which might have been offered
earlier.
B.

Second Appeal: Revision

In regular civil cases, judgments of the Oberlandesgerichtare subject to appeal, if at all, to the Bundesgerichishof. Here, review is limited
to questions of law, and is called Revision. Over sixty percent of the
civil caseload of the Bundesgerichtshof is made up of these review

cases, 27 1 and they are clearly the most time-consuming civil matters
before that court. The percentage of Oberlandesgerichtjudgments in
which review is sought has been relatively high: the Preparatory Com-

mission found that twelve to thirteen percent of all contested Oberlandesgericht civil judgments in the 1950's were appealed to the

Bundesgerichtshof,272 and in 1981 the review rate was still close to ten
percent. 273 The Bundesgerichtshof,as the court of last resort for ques-

tions of ordinary civil and criminal law, serves a role analogous to that
of the supreme courts of all fifty of the United States as well as the
nonconstitutional cases of the United States Supreme Court. It should

not be surprising, therefore, even with judicial staffing which has increased from about 58 in 1951274 to 112 in 1981,275 that the Bundesgerings attributable to the new matter, however excusable, will be fatal. See Judgment of June
4, 1981, LG Koblenz, 35 NJW 289.
270. Judgment of Oct. 7, 1980, BVerfG, 34 NJW 271 (1st Sen.). The decision and its
consequences for interpretation of the provision are discussed in Wolf, Die Berlcksichtigung
verspitteten Vorbringens in der Berufungsinstanz, 94 ZZP 320 (1981). See Fisch, supra note
66, at 49-50.
271. See RECHTSPFLEGE, supra note 130, table 12.1 (1981) (2421 of the 3844 new cases
filed in the BGH in 1981 were review cases).
272. BERICHT DER KoMMISSION 1961, supra note 37, at 143.
273. RECHTSPFLEGE, supra note 130, table 8.2 (1981) reports 25,299 contested judgments
of OLGs in 1981; table 12.1 reports 2421 new review cases filed in the same year. While not
all of those review cases challenged 1981 judgments, the figures give a rough approximation
of appeal rates.
274. BERICHT DER KOMMISSION 1961, supra note 37, at 147.
275. RECHrTSPFLEGE, supra note 130, table 2.3 n.2 (1981).
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ichtshof's caseload has been a matter of continuing concern since its
inception." 6 In civil cases specifically, the chief complaint has been the
length of time it takes to process a matter in the Bundesgerichtshof. The
Preparatory Commission found that about three quarters of all civil
review cases took over nine months. 277 Proposals to increase efficiency
have focused on two approaches: (1) reducing the court's jurisdiction,
and (2) streamlining its procedures. The measures actually adopted
have taken both forms.
1. Jurisdiction of the Reviewing Court
Since 1950, the Bundesgerichtshof has had jurisdiction to review
cases on two bases: (1) by leave of the Oberlandesgericht rendering
judgment granted without regard to the amount in controversy if the
court found the case to be one of fundamental importance or if it deviated from a prior opinion of the Bundesgerichishof (Zulassmngsrevision); or (2) without leave of court, if the amount in controversy
exceeded a specified sum, originally DM 6000 (Wertrevision).2' 8 As of
1961, about twenty percent of the ordinary review cases came by way
of certification by the lower appellate courts, and eighty percent on the
basis of amount in controversy." 9 This ratio was the same in 1981.11 0
The original jurisdictional bases responded to the two best accepted functions of appellate review: assuring uniform interpretation
and development of the law on the one hand, and correctness of individual judgments on the other.
The Preparatory Commission concluded, however, that the
Bundesgerichtshofcould not continue to perform both functions without an unacceptable increase in personnel, and that uniformity of interpretation was the more appropriate function for the only national civil
court. It therefore recommended that Wertrevision be abandoned alto" ' The Civil Procedure
gether.28
Commission, on the other hand, maintained that abandonment of Wertrevision would simply encourage
more litigation over whether a particular matter was of "fundamental
importance," and would not produce the desired relief. Moreover, it
276. Among the most recent expressions of alarm is Kornblum, Zur Refision des Rerisionsrechts, 13 ZRP 185 (1980).
277. BERICHT DER KoMMISSlON 1961, supra note 37, table 5(a). at 146.

278. ZPO § 546 (1950).
279. See BERICHT DER KOMMISSION 1961, supra note 37, table 3, at 144.

280. RECHTSPFLEGE, supra note 130, table 12.8 (1981): 1773 Wertrevision and 395 Zulassungsrevision dispositions were recorded in 1981.
281.

BERICHT DER KOMMISSION 1961, supra note 37. at 157.
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argued that the court's procedure is designed solely to produce a cor-

rect result in the individual case, so that a shift to "fundamental importance" as the sole criterion for jurisdiction would require basic changes
in the manner of handling cases once accepted for review.2 82 The Civil

Procedure Commission therefore recommended simply raising the
minimum amount in controversy for Wertrevision. Prior to 1975, the

parliament responded twice to this position, raising the minimum
amount from DM 6000 to DM 15,000 in 1964, and again to DM 25,000
in 1969. 283

By the 1970's, an alternative to Zulassungsrevision gained prominence in the debate, inspired in part by the example of the United

States Supreme Court. In this alternative, called "revision by acceptance," the Bundesgerichtshofs jurisdiction would not depend on the

Oberlandesgericht'sfindings of importance, but on the highest court's
determination that the case was of general interest.

The legislature was ultimately unwilling to give up the policy of
correcting errors in a particular case. In 1975, the Review Amendment 284 struck a compromise among the various proposals. New ZPO
section 546 retains Zuiassungsrevision, but the minimum amount in
controversy, below which judgments involving money or property can
be reviewed only by lower appellate court certification, is raised to DM
40,000.285 New section 554b adopts a backhanded version of An-

nahmerevision, by authorizing the court to deny review by a two-thirds
vote with respect to judgments with an amount in controversy exceeding DM 40,000, unless the case is one of fundamental importance.28 6
282. BERICHT DER KoMMISSION 1977, supra note 2, at 168.

283. See 1969 BGBI 1 1141 (W. Ger.).
284. See supra note 21.
285. ZPO § 546 (1977). Section 546 reads as follows:
I. In cases involving patrimonial claims, in which the amount in controversy does
not exceed forty thousand German marks, and those involving non-patrimonial
claims, review is available only if the Oberlandesgericht has authorized it in its
judgment. The Oberlandesgericht must authorize review if
1. the legal issues are of fundamental importance, or
2. the judgment deviates from a decision of the Bundsgerichtshof or the
Joint Senate of Federal Courts and rests upon this deviation.
The reviewing court is bound by the authorization.
II. In cases involving patrimonial claims, the Oberlandesgericht must fix the
amount in controversy in its judgment. The reviewing court is bound by this determination, if the amount so fixed exceeds forty thousand German marks.
286. Id § 554b. Section 554b reads as follows:
I. In cases involving patrimonial claims, in which the amount in controversy exceeds forty thousand German marks, the reviewing court may refuse to accept the
review, if the matter does not have fundamental importance.
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Thus, in Wertrevision the court now has jurisdiction unless it explicitly
denies it, whereas the original idea of 4nnahnzerevision was that jurisdiction would depend on affirmative acceptance. 8 7 The provision offers no criteria for such a denial, but the permissive mode suggests
discretion. A number of writers and the Federal Supreme Court itself
interpreted the provision to include consideration of substantively unrelated factors, such as the court's workload.2 88
Constitutional objections were raised against section 554b as soon
as it was proposed in legislative committee.2 8 9 The argument crystallized around two points. First, the discretion arguably violates the rule
of law (Rechtsstaaqrinzio),which demands not only material justice
but also reasonable legal certainty. The applicant bears the costs of an
unsuccessful application for review, and is entitled to know the criteria
upon which a decision will be based, so that the risks can be reasonably
predicted. Second, the discretion violates the litigants' right to equal
treatment, since persons in comparable situations--those against whom
erroneous judgments have been rendered-may be treated differently
for nonmaterial reasons, such as the court's workload. 29°
In 1980, the Plenum of the Federal Constitutional Court, after its
two Senates had taken opposing views, adopted the argument that discretionary jurisdiction violates the constitutional right to equal treatment.2 9' It saved the statute, however, by placing a limiting
interpretation on it: the Bundesgerichtshof may deny review only on
the ground that the application has no prospect of ultimate success.
The workload of the court may not be considered.2 92 Denial thus becomes analogous to the United States Supreme Court's dismissal of an
2 93
appeal for want of a substantial federal question.
II. For denial of acceptance of a majority of two-thirds is required.
I1. The decision may be made by order without oral hearing.
287. See, ag., H. PRiOrTING, DIE ZULASSUNG DER REVIsION 271 (1977).
288. Judgment of Nov. 11, 1976, BGH, 32 JZ 105, 106; H. PR"rrING, supra note 287. at
275; R. BRUNS, supra note 159, at 422; Grunsky Ablehnung der Annahrne der Revision und
Entlastungdes Revisionsgerichts, 34 JZ 129, 130 (1979).
289. See Judgment of June I1, 1980, BVerfG, 34 NJW 39, 40 (Plenum). For further
details on the debate, see Fisch, supra note 66, at 41-45.
290. Both arguments were articulated and adopted by the Federal Constitutional Court's
Second Senate. Judgment of Aug. 9, 1978, BVerfG, 49 BVerfGE 148.
291. Judgment of June 11, 1980, BVerfG, 34 NJW 39.
292. Id The court found that the principal legislative purpose for retaining Wiertrevision
and for leaving denial of review of nonfundamentally-important cases in the court's discretion, was to leave some room for the correction of error in those cases. An interpretation of
the statute which removes the discretion, but bases denial on the absence of a prima facie
showing of error, is therefore not inconsistent with its general purpose.
293. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976); Sup. CT. R. 15(l)(h), requires a statement, among other
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2. Streamlined Procedure
The two Commissions considered a number of possible economizing changes in the procedure of Revision by the Federal Supreme
Court, three of which were the most prominent: (a) permitting the
court to dispense with an oral hearing; (b) permitting the court to
render a decision without an opinion; and (c) precluding a review by
the court of the Oberlandesgerichl'sdetermination that a case is of fundamental importance.
a. Dispensing With Hearing

Largely because it advocated restricting review to cases of fundamental importance, the Preparatory Commission rejected as unproductive a proposal granting the court discretion to dispense with the oral
hearing. 94 The Civil Procedure Commission, on the other hand, having opted to retain the Wertrevision, recommended that the court be
authorized to decide any case under review without an oral hearing, if
it concluded by unanimous vote that the petition for review was unfounded and a hearing was not necessary. 295 This recommendation
was immediately taken up by the parliament as a temporary measure,
adopted in 1969 and applicable until 1972.296 The Review Amendment

of 1975 allowed this more general provision to lapse, but new section
554b permits the decision rejecting Wertrevision to be made without a
hearing, on a two-thirds vote.2 97 The ZPO had long permitted the

court to decide, without a hearing, whether the petition for review is
sufficient on its face. This provision is retained in section 554a. Out of
the 1773 Wertrevision dispositions in 1981, seventy-two were made
under section 554a and 896 under section 554b, a combined total of
54.6% of such dispositions.298
b. Dispensing With Opinion

The Preparatory Commission's rejection of Wertrevision also led
to its disapproval of the no-opinion device. 299 The Civil Procedure
things, of the reasons why the questions presented are so substantial as to require plenary
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FED-

consideration. See generally 16 C.

ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4014 (1977).

294. BERICHT DER KoMMISSION 1961, supra note 37, at 150.
295. BERICHT DER KOMMISSION 1977, supra note 2, at 169.

296. 1969 BGB1 1141 (W. Ger.).
297. ZPO § 554b (1979).
298. RECHTSPFLEGE, supra note 130, table 12.8 (1981).
299. BERICHT DER KoMMISSION 1961, supra note 37, at 149-50.
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Commission in turn recommended that the otherwise universal requirement of opinion °° be dropped in the case of assignments of ordinary procedural error which the court finds to be unsubstantiated . n0
The Review Amendment of 1975 adopted this recommendation by adding present section 565a.30 2
In practice, the court has also dispensed with opinion in denying
acceptance of Wertrevision under section 554b. This developed, to be
sure, under the original assumption that that provision gave the court
true discretion. The 1978 case in which the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court first held this discretion unconstitutional was
one in which the Federal Supreme Court's order was without opinion.
The order was overturned because it was impossible to tell from the
order that it was not based on the unconstitutional interpretation.' 3 A
year later, however, the Second Senate upheld a similar order which
read: "[Review denied] pursuant to 554b I ZPO as interpreted by the
BVerfG (order of 9.8.78). . .... The Second Senate found this lan3 °4
guage constitutionally satisfactory.
c. EliminatingReview of Appellate Court Findingsof
FundamentalImportance
Both Commissions recommended that the existing system of Zulassungsrevision be retained, but with the Bundesgerichtshofbeing expressly bound by the Oberlandesgericht's certification of cases for
review because of fundamental importance. Two alternatives-leaving
the determination of fundamental importance wholly to the highest
court and permitting review of an appellate court denial of certification-were rejected, principally on the ground that the task of making
such threshhold rulings would overload the Bundesgerichishof with
300. ZPO § 323 16 (1977) (made application to Resision by ZPO § 557's general incorporation of the first-instance procedural rules).
301. BERicHT DER KOMMISSION 1961, supra note 37, at 169.
302. ZPO § 565a (1975). The decision does not require a statement of reasons, to the
extent that the reviewing court considers assignments or procedural error unsubstantiated.
This does not apply to assignments under § 551 (specifying certain automatic grounds for
reversal, such as a disqualified judge, lack of jurisdiction, improper exclusion of public at
hearing, or failure to give reasons for judgment).
303. Judgment of Aug. 9, 1978, BVerfG, 49 BVerfGE 148.
304. Judgment of Feb. 28, 1978, BVerfG, 32 NJW 1161 (2d Sen.). The propriety of such
a denial without opinion is vigorously contested by Kaempfe, Die Zukunft der Revision in
Zivilsachen, 32 NJW 1134 n.32 (1979); it is qualifiedly accepted by Kramer, Verfassungsrechiliche Aspekte des neuen Revisionsrechts, 34 NJW 799, 800 (1981).
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groundless petitions." 5 The Review Amendment of 1975 adopted this
recommendation in new section 546 13: "The reviewing court is bound
by the certification." 30 6 The court has interpreted section 546 as precluding review of certification denials. 0 7
3. Results
The Preparatory Commission posited as a principal goal in reforming the review procedure that the normal length of time for
processing cases in the Bundesgerich/shof be six to eight months. 08
Most of its specific recommendations for reform were not adopted, but
the changes that were made have allowed some modest improvement.
Whereas the Preparatory Commission found nearly 75% of all review
cases taking more than nine months, with the median over twelve
months,30 9 the 1981 figures show only 59.6% lasting more than nine
months and 58.9% lasting less than twelve months.3 t0
The efficiency measure most relied upon, the summary denial of
Wertrevision, which many feared would be emasculated by the Federal
Constitutional Court's limiting interpretation,31 ' is entitled to most of
the credit for this improvement. Indeed, two sets of statistics indicate
particular improvement since 1978, when the limiting interpretation
was first imposed. In the first place, denials of review were more frequent in 1981312 than in 1977 (the last full year before the interpretation).313 In the second place, the 1977 figures show a processing time
only marginally better than the 1950's, with more than half of the cases
still lasting more than twelve months.314
305. BERICHT DER KOMMISSION 1961, supra note 37, at 157-58; BERICIlT DER KoMMIS-

SION 1977, supra note 2, at 168-69.
306. ZPO § 546 I 3 (1975).
307. Judgment of Sept. 26, 1979, BGH, 33 NJW 344; A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACII, &
J. ALBERS, supra note 64, ZPO § 546 n.2 (D)(b).
308. BERICHT DER KoMMISSION 1961, supra note 37, at 147.
309. Id table 5(a), at 146, 148.
310. RECHTSPFLEGE, Bundesgerichtshof, supra note 130, table 12.9 (1981).
311. A member of the Bundesgerichtshof is quoted to this effect in Radloff, Comment, 32
NJW 534 (1979). See also Kaempfe, supra note 304; Kornblum, supra note 276.
312. RECHTSPFLEGE, supra note 130, table 12.8 (1981): 897 of 2343 dispositions (38.3%)
were made under ZPO § 554(b).
313. Id table 10.11 (1977): 664 of 2374 dispositions (28%) were made under ZPO
§ 554(b).
314. Id table 11.8 (1977): 51.3% had lasted more than 12 months.
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VI.

COSTS AND LEGAL ASSISTANCE

A. Costs in General
Despite much debate, the current West German reform movement
has produced no change in the fundamental pattern of cost determination and the allocation of cost burdens in the ordinary civil action. The
two most important cost elements, general court fees and attorneys'
fees, are still fixed by statutory fee scales graduated by amount in controversy.315 The ultimate judgment loser must normally
carry the en31 6
tire cost burden for both sides and for all stages.

There has been some inflation in the amount of the cost burden for
a given amount in controversy, most notably in attorneys' fees. Between 1957311 and the present 318 the basic unit of court fee for a case
involving DM 5000 has increased 12.6%, from DM 103 to DM 116.
During the same period, the increase in the basic unit of attorney's fee
for the same case has been from DM 185 to DM 247, or 33.5%.319 The
overall basic cost burden for a case involving DM 5000, if fully litigated through the Landgericht, is made up of multiples of each of the
two elements. Leaving out incidentals, that burden has increased from
28.4% of the amount in controversy in 1957 (DM 1419) to 36.6% of the
amount in controversy today (DM 1830). The comparable overall
figures for a case involving DM 100,000 are more dramatic: in 1957, a
total burden of DM 7071, or 7.1%; today, a total burden of DM 11,946,
or 11.95%.
315. General court fees are governed by GKG § 11 (1975) (W. Ger.); Annex I is a catalogue of procedural events giving rise to fees; Annex 2 is a table of amounts in controversy
and corresponding fee levels. Attorneys' fees are governed by BRAGO § 11, with a table of
amounts in controversy and corresponding fee levels. Sections 3-9 of the ZPO govern determination of amount in controversy. See Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, suara note 1, at
1461, with excerpts from then current tables; more recent data are found in Bender & Strecker, FederalRepublic of Germany, in I AccEss TO JUSTICE 530 (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth
eds. 1978).
316. ZPO § 91 (1950). Section 92 requires allocation among the parties pro rata where
each party wins in part and loses in part. Since this provision applies where a claimant is
awarded substantially less than his original demand, ZPO § 92 II, it has been noted that a
divided cost award is the rule rather than the exception. See R. TRorT, PRACTICAL LEGAL
GUIDE ON COSTS & FEES, COURT PROCEEDINGS AND COMMERCIAL LAW 28-29 (1977). On
the system of cost allocation generally, see L. ROSENBERG & K. SCHWAB, Jspra note 99. § 87
III.
317. GKG, 1957 BGBI 1941 (W. Ger.).
318. GKG, 1975 BGBI 1 3047 (W. Ger.).
319. BRAGO. 1957 BGBI 1907 (W. Ger.). The most recent amendment of the table in
the Annex to BRAGO § 11 was adopted in the BRAGO, 1980 BGBI 11503 (W. Ger.) (Fifth
Law to Amend), which took effect January 1, 1981.
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B. Legal Aid in Litigation
While the Preparatory Commission did consider the problem of
legal aid and made some recommendations, 320 it did not become a matter of overriding concern until the late 1960's, a period of heightened
social consciousness in general. After the 1976 Congress of German
Lawyers made access to justice a principal topic of its deliberations, the
federal government adopted legal aid reform as a major program. The
Civil Procedure Commission made extensive recommendations for reform,32 ' and a comprehensive draft of new legislation was presented to
the legislature in 1979. 322 While the final product 3 2 3 may ultimately
have only modest actual impact on access to the courts for low income
persons,324 it did change the former system325 in a number of interesting respects.
1. Eligibility
The most noticeable change in eligibility for legal aid in litigation
is the extension of assistance to a much broader range of income levels,
through the device of a sliding scale of partial contributions from the
beneficiary. New ZPO section 114 now includes, as an appendix, a table of amounts which a beneficiary is required to contribute toward
litigation costs, according to the amount of monthly income and the
number of dependents. 326 A single person with a monthly income of
under DM 851 (about $360) or a person with five dependents earning
up to DM 2400 (about $1000) per month pays nothing. A single person
earning DM 2400 or a person with five dependents earning DM 3950
pays DM 520.327 According to ZPO section 115, a beneficiary must
also apply his property to the payment of litigation costs, so far as this
320. BERICHT DER KoMMISSION 1961, supra note 37, at 268. For a historical summary,
see Schuster, Dos Gesetz Uber die Prozesskostenhilpe, 9 ZZP 361 (1980).
321. BERICHT DER KOMMISSION 1977, supra note 2, at 229.
322. BUNDESRATS-DRUCKSACHE 187/79, Apr. 18, 1979.
323. Prozesskostenhilfegesetz, 1980 BGBI 1677 (W. Ger.) (Law on Assistance for Litigation Costs).
324. Schneider, Prozesskostenhip/e, 33 MDR 1 (1981), expresses skepticism, as does
Holch, Prozesskostenhife-aufKostendes Persenlichkeisschutzes?,34 NJW 151, 152 (1981).
325. ZPO §§ 224 (1950) (entitled "Poor Law" (Armenrecht)); for a description which remained generally valid until 1980, see Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 1, at
1467. A more recent summary of the actual situation and of reform proposals is found in
Baumgartel, Zugang zum Gerichtfir Unterpriviligierte: 'Rechtshife' und Rechlsberatung, in
HUMANE JUSTIZ 17 (P. Gilles ed. 1977). See also Bender & Strecker, supra note 315; G.
BAUMGXRTEL, GLEICHER ZUGANG ZUM RECHT FUR ALLE (1976).
326. ZPO § 114 (1980).
327. Id

19831

West German Civil Procedure

is conscionable by the standards applicable to public welfare cases.328 If
the amount of anticipated costs remaining after application of the
property in satisfaction does not exceed four monthly contributions by
329
the table under section 114, no legal aid will be granted.
As under the prior law, legal aid will be granted to a financially
eligible person only if he can show both that he has a "sufficient prospect of success" and that his pursuit of claim or defense is not "capricious" (mutwillig).331 In general, the first criterion has been interpreted
as a prima facie case requirement, satisfied if the beneficiary can raise
serious issues for resolution by regular proceedings. 33' The second criterion refers to the value of a judgment once obtained: if the opponent
is judgment proof, or the relief sought would have no concrete value to
the beneficiary, assistance will be denied.332
2. Procedure
The 1980 reform effected a simplification of the procedure for obtaining legal aid in several respects. A nationally uniform statement of
financial circumstances was adopted, 333 and the application to the court
no longer requires certification by the applicant's local welfare office. 3
Moreover, the procedure or application is to be written; an oral hearing
is permitted only under rare circumstances. 335 On the other hand, each
new court through which the case passes requires a completely new
336
application for assistance.
3. Costs Covered
As under prior law, the granting of legal assistance affects only the
costs attributable to the beneficiary-that is, the beneficiary remains
personally responsible337in full for his opponent's taxable costs, should
the beneficiary lose.
This hangover has been subjected to criti338
cism.
To the extent that assistance is granted without contribution
328. Id § 115.
329. Id
330. Id § 114.
331. See A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH & P. HARTMANN, supra note 55,

ZPO § 114

2(B)(a).
332. See id 2(B)(b); L. ROSENBERG & K. SCHWAB, supra note 99, § 90 111.
333. See 34 NJW 804 (1981) (a report).
334. ZPO § 117 (1980).
335. Id § 118.
336. Id § 119.
337. Id § 123.
338. See, eg., Grunsky, Die Neuen Gesetze Iaber die Prozesskosten-unddie Beratungshilfe, 33 NJW 2041, 2046 (1980); Schuster, supra note 320, at 390.
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by the beneficiary the opponent's obligation to pay court fees is waived
339
pending final outcome.
4. Appointment of Attorney
Under the prior law an attorney would be appointed for the beneficiary only where such representation is required (in the Landgerich/
and higher courts), or where it appeared "necessary." In general, appointment was made by the court from attorneys of its own choice, and
could include apprentice attorneys or bureaucrats. Under the new section 121, the beneficiary is entitled to have an available attorney of his
own choice appointed not only where representation is required by law
or appears necessary, but also when the opponent is represented by
counsel. 340 Apprentices and bureaucrats are no longer options.3 4'
As under the prior law, the fee scale for attorneys appointed under
legal aid is set by a separate provision.342 For amounts in controversy
up to DM 6300, the scale is identical to that for unassisted parties. For
higher amounts in controversy, the fee for appointed counsel still rises
much more gradually than the regular fee, and the highest permissible
basic fee unit is DM 540. To the extent that the beneficiary is required
to contribute to payment of costs, additional compensation is due the
attorney, up to the regular fee.343 The disparity between the regular
scale and the legal aid scale is generally somewhat less than before.
C. Extra-Judicial Legal Assistance
The year 1980 also brought a major innovation in the West German system of public assistance for extra-judicial legal services. Under
the Law on Legal Advice and Representation for Low Income Citizens, 344 persons may be eligible for consultation with a lawyer of their
choice at public expense, on three conditions: (1) that the person is
unable to pay for a lawyer with his own funds; 3 45 (2) that other sources
of assistance, such as group legal services arrangements, 346 are not rea339. ZPO § 122 (1980).
340. Id § 121.
341. Id
342. BRAGO § 123.
343. BRAGO § 124.
344. Beratungshilfegesetz [BerHG], 1980 BGBI I 689 (W. Ger.) (effective date Jan. 1,
1981).
345. According to § 1(2) of the law, this condition is met when the applicant would be
eligible for litigation-cost assistance without personal contribution.
346. See Bischof, Praxisprobleme des Beratungshilfegesetzes, 34 NJW 894, 895 (1981).
Grunsky, supra note 338, at 2047.
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sonably available; and (3) that the pursuit of his rights is not "capricious." Lawyers are required to take eligible clients who approach7
them directly, unless "important reasons" justify turning them down.4
The law provides for compensation at modest levels to attorneys pro-

viding such services,"4 but in certain states where publicly funded legal

advice facilities are established, the low income person may be required to utilize these services instead of consulting with an attorney of
his choice.34 9 Prior to 1980, such public assistance was provided in

most states by local bar organizations on an uncompensated basis, and
was found wanting. 5 0 While it is too early to tell how well the new
system is working, it is generally assumed that it effects a substantial
improvement.3 5 t

VII.

CONCLUSION

A. The Impact of the Reforms
The overriding emphasis of the postwar reform movement in West
German civil procedure has been an increasing efficiency in order to

combat delay, the most generally acknowledged evil. To the extent
that the system has been perceived as unfair, the principal focus of criticism has been on cost barriers to access to the courts. Procedural rules
as such have not been widely challenged as unjust. If the impact of the

reform movement is to be measured by its own goals, therefore, improvement in the areas of cost and delay must first be sought. It then
remains to ask what price has been paid for such improvement.
347. BerHG § 11, 1980 BGBI I (W. Ger.) (adding a new §49a of the
Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung[BRAO] (Federal Ordinance on Attorneys)).
348. Id § 8. The attorney is entitled to a waivable fee of DM 20 from the applicant.
Section 10 of the law adds a new BRAGO § 132, which sets fees to be paid from public
funds: for advice or for information not otherwise compensated, DM 30; for the handling of
a matter by the drafting of instruments, evaluation of documents, representation before
courts, agencies or others, or participation in proof-taking, DM 80; and for such activity
resulting in a settlement or disposition of a matter, DM 100.
349. Id § 14. In Hamburg and Bremen, the public facility is the exclusive source of
assistance; in Berlin, subject to local law, the applicant may choose between the public facility and private attorneys. On the operation of the Hamburg facility, which dates from the
1920's, see Falke, Bierbrauer & Koch, LegalAdvice and the Non-judicialSettlement of Disputes: A Case Study ofthe PublicLegalAdvice andMediation Centerin the Cit , ofHamburg,
in II AccEss TO JUSTICE 103 (M. Cappelletti & J. Weisner eds. 1978).
350. Critical essays and case studies are gathered in RECHTSBERATUNO ALS LEBENSHILFE (T. RASEHORN ed. 1979).
351. See Blankenburg, Zur Implementation des Beratungshilfegesetres, in REcitT UND
POLrrIK 84 (1981).
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1. Delay
The vast majority of the changes effected by the reform movement,
from the case-deciding single judge and the concentration of the oral
hearing to the restriction of access to the Federal Supreme Court, have
been designed to reduce the overall length of the lawsuit. The statistics
indicate at least marginal improvement in this respect in the late 1970's,
in all types of cases and at all levels. Since the court most affected by
the changes is the Landgericht sitting at first instance, it is not surprising to find the most improvement in those courts. The following tables
show the percentage of cases disposed of within six months and twelve
months, respectively, in three categories defined by the form of disposition: (a) all ordinary civil cases; (b) those disposed of by contested
judgment; and (c) those disposed of by formal settlement. Data for
352 data
1971 are taken from a private compilation of official statistics;
3
for 1977-1981 are taken directly from official publications. "3
Table 1: 6-Month Completion Rate
all civil

contested

cases

cases

(0/)

year

1971
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

63.9
62.9/66.7
68.4
70.3
71.5

71.7

settled
cases

(%1)(7)
41.8
43.9/46.5
49.0
51.0
52.4
51.5

55.2
56.3/58.0
60.9
63.7
64.1

64.1

352. E. BLANKENBURG, H. MORASCH & H. WOLFF, I TATSACHEN ZUR REFORM DUR
ZIVILGERICHTSBARKEIT 36 (table 2.41) (1974).
353. RECHTSPFLEGE, supra note 130, table 4.3 (1977-1980), table 5.3 (1981).
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Table 2: 12-Month Completion Rate
all civil
cases

contested
cases

year

settled
cases

(171
M()

1971
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

85.7
84.2/85.6
87.4
88.7
90.1
90.5

73.7
72.7/75.3
77.2
79.5
81.6
81.5

82.0
80.8/82.7
84.0
86.1
87.8
88.2

It is almost impossible to tell whether these improvements are directly attributable to formal changes in procedural rules, or simply the
result of a docket-clearing psychology generated by the debate over delay and its causes. The fact that a significant improvement appears in
the second half of 1977-after the "Simplification Amendment" went
into effect on July 1, 1977-suggests that the formal changes did have
some effect. On the same date, however, the Family Law Reform Act
went into effect as well, transferring family cases to the4mtsgerichtand
thus arguably freeing judicial energy in the Landgericht for other
cases.

354

2.

Cost

Except for legal aid, it is obvious that no improvement has been
achieved in the cost system from the litigant's point of view. While a
comprehensive dismantling of court cost assessment, the so-called "no
charge judicial service" (Nulltarif), was proposed and considered in
the 1970's, it met with general opposition on purely fiscal grounds and
was abandoned. 355 The best that can be said about legislative changes
in the cost area is that increases in court and attorneys' fees may not
quite have kept up with overall inflation in the economy. There has
been substantial improvement in the availability of assistance for litigants unable to pay costs, but beyond the smallest cases it falls short of
an equalization of resources. In particular, the residual cost burden on
a poor litigant who is unsuccessful-payment of the opponent's attorneys' fees and costs-must continue to operate as a considerable deterrent. For the unassisted litigant, however, even a substantial
acceleration of the overall pace of lawsuits brings no cost relief, be354. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
355. See G. BAUMGXRTEL, GLEICHER ZUGANG

ZUM RECiT FUR ALLE

128-34 (1976).
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cause all fees are fixed by a combination of the amount in controversy
and classes of procedural event (filing, negotiating, hearing, proof-taking, settlement, and judgment). Neither reducing the number of hearings nor shortening the overall length of time between filing and
disposition of the case would directly affect the principal cost burden.
The court statistics indicate one area of modest improvement in
efficiency which has some cost-saving impact, however. This improvement is an increase in the percentage of Landgericht dispositions, both
by contested judgment and by formal settlement, without proof-taking,
Proof-taking is no longer a separate court fee event, 35 6 but dispensing
with it does save attorneys' fees. The following table demonstrates the
progress between 1971 and 1981 for disposition without proof-taking
by (a) contested judgment and (b) formal settlement.357
Table 3: Disposition Without Proof-Taking
contested judgment
year

1971
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

M%

30.3
35.0
35.8
37.1
38.0
39.8

formal settlement
(%/)
29.4
36.3
35.9
35.9
36.8
38.3

3. The Price of Acceleration: Formalism
The device most heavily relied upon by the reforms to effect an
acceleration of the lawsuit is the deadline sanctioned by preclusion of
late material. It is clear that the incidence of preclusion is greater since
the adoption of the new rules, although it is difficult to quantify. 358
Unless the lawyers respond to this increased pressure by more aggressive investigation than is traditional, the result may well be the increase
in artificial and unresponsive judgments which critics have feared.35 9
356. See GKG Annex 1, No. 1016.

357. For 1971, see E. BLANKENBURG, H. MORASCH & H. WOLFF, supra note 352, table
2.34; for 1977-1981, see RECHTSPFLEGE, supra note 130, table 4.4 (1977-1980), table 5.4

(1981).
358. Walchshofer, supra note 108, at 188 found in data gathered by the Bavarian Ministry of Justice in 1978 that between 6% to 10% of all cases in most Landgericht involved
preclusion.
359. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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Judgments finding negligence on the part of lawyers for missing deadlines have begun to appear,360 but they are in themselves just another
judicial burden and a poor substitute for a sound judgment on the merits. Moreover, the legislature's reluctance to forego admission of late
material altogether produced loopholes such as "escape by default"36'
and "escape by appeal," 362 perhaps encouraging a tactical approach to
procedure from which the German system has been relatively free in
the past.
B. Points of Contrast with American Procedure
1. Episodic Proof-Taking Disapproved
The West German reforms of the 1970's have gone a long way to
discourage that feature which Kaplan 36 3 thought to be the German
lawsuit's distinguishing characteristic: the fragmentation of the prooftaking process into multiple hearings, with freedom of the parties to
raise new issues at virtually any time before judgment. Century-long
criticism of the delays inherent in this practice finally gained favor, and
the reformers' stated goal of concentrating the trial into a single principal session has been backed up by real commitment. The use of deadlines and preclusion generate considerable pressure to disclose claims
and defenses, supported by offers of proof, in the pre-hearing procedure. Even where prooftaking is done separately, there is now typically
only one such session.
2. The Dominant Role of the Judge
The "grand discriminant" between West German and American
procedure today is the division of labor between judge and lawyers.
German civil procedure is a judge-driven system, and, if anything, the
reforms of the 1970's have reinforced that tendency. A number of
functions which are performed principally by the lawyers or a court
reporter in the United States are allocated to the judge in West Germany. The most important of these functions are: (a) determination of
the trial agenda, including an order of proof directing appearance 364
of
the parties and witnesses, and the presentation of documents;
360. See Forster, Anwaltsverschulden, BDroversehen und Wiedereinset.ung, 33 NJW 432
(1980); Judgment of July 2, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof, 33 NJW 2261; Judgment of Mar. 1I,
1980, Bundesgerichtshof, 33 NJW 1846.
361. See supra note 180 and accompanying text ("escape by default").
362. See supra note 269 and accompanying text ("escape by appeal").
363. See Kaplan, supra note 11.
364. There is some analogy to the pretrial order which issues in United States federal
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(b) examination of parties and witnesses, with lawyers performing only
an interstitial role; (c) production of the record of witnesses' testimony,
excluding questions and frequently rephrasing or reorganizing answers;
and (d) direct communication with the parties, not only for factual assertions, but also to explore settlement possibilities. 365 While West
German procedural theory continues to adhere to the principle of party
control (Verhandlungsmaxime) in civil cases, it seems clear that this
guarantees only the judge's ultimate dependence on the raw material
which the parties present.366 The opportunity of the judge, as fact
finder, to influence the form and organization of the material on which
he must base his findings, and even to stimulate production of more
material, 367 is so much greater in the West German than in the American system that it must be regarded as a distinguishing feature-however varied its exploitation by different judicial personalities.
3. Evidence and Its Production
Kaplan's observation that "the search for facts is neither broad nor
vigorous" ' 368 in West Germany is essentially valid today. There is some
possibility that the pressures of malpractice claims for failure to meet
deadlines, resulting in preclusion of otherwise dispositive material, will
infuse the legal profession with greater investigative desire. Increases
in the statutory fee scale may also help, but the scheme of attorneys'
fees remains virtually free of rewards for extra effort.
Moreover, the German system remains relatively indifferent to
possibilities for pretrial exchange of information and evidence between
the parties. The reform discussions contain some expressions of concern over this issue, and some references to United States or English
discovery procedures occasionally appear in the literature.3 69 At this
courts after pretrial conference under FED. R. Civ. P. 16, but since such an order is a
blueprint for party presentation of evidence, it remains largely a product of their preparation
and strategies.
365. See supra note 243.
366. See, e.g., R. BRUNS, supra note 159, at 98-99.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 229-37. In addition to the general judicial duty
to clarify through questioning, the ZPO § 142 empowers the judge to require production of
documents in a party's possession to which the party has referred or which relate to the
matter in dispute, § 143, to call up documents in the possession of public officials, § 27211, to
order a judicial view or call for an expert opinion, § 144. Betterman, supra note 7, at 385,
sees a shift from party control to judicial control as a principal feature of 20th-century reform, and disapproves.
368. Kaplan, supra note I, at 420.
369. Jacoby, Das Erforschungsyerfahren in 4merikanischen Zihi/prozess, 74 ZZP 145
(1961) (contains extensive discussion of discovery procedure in the United States and recom-
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point, however, no fundamental change seems likely. What has
changed in this respect, perhaps, is the United States attitude toward
discovery. Given the current obsession in the United States' with the
abuses, costs and delays of discovery, and our efforts to bring its use
under control,37 ° it can hardly be expected that other systems will follow the United States example.
With the disapproval of "episodic proof-taking" as the principal
means of self-correction available to the German judge, appeal now
bears the major burden of factual correction. Here, too, the trap of
preclusion may seriously limit the opportunities for new evidence or
defenses, and the corrective measure may often consist simply of renewed examination of the evidence by a different set of minds.
4. Quick Access to a Judge
Whether it results from these differing attitudes toward judges and
evidence or from some other cause, the West German system retains
and perhaps has strengthened its single greatest advantage over the typical United States lawsuit, namely, its comparative ease of access to a
judge for consideration of the merits at a relatively early stage in the
litigation. Judges are sufficiently numerous that backlogs are at bearable levels in most places. Hearings can be scheduled within a few
months, at least. Despite the long standing and recently intensified interest in settlement, the continued high proportion of contested judgments suggests that decision is what litigants most frequently desire
after all. This impression is now being reinforced in the United States
mends consideration of similar devices for West Germany). The Civil Procedure Commission recommended the establishment of a general obligation of the parties to cooperate in
the evidence gathering process, sanctioned by permitting the judge to draw inferences
favorable to a party whose efforts to prove an allegation are frustrated by even innocent
conduct on the part of his opponent. See BERICHT DER KoMMiSSION 1977, .wpra note 2. at
121. In a few cases involving unfair competition and medical malpractice, the Bundesgerichtshof has imposed a duty on the party in possession of information to produce it. even
though the other side has the burden of persuasion. See Huber, Ungleiche4uftlrungsmogichkeiten der Parteien, 35 MDR 95 (1981); these are largely founded on the nature of the
norm involved or on pre-existing obligations, however. R. BRtJNS,Supra note 159. at 210-11.
regrets the prevailing attitude that a party has no obligation to supply the other with weapons he doesn't already have. Arens, Zur 4uftdrungspflicht der nicht beweirbelastetenPanei
im Zivilprozess, 96 ZZP 1 (1983), with an extended review of the literature, opposes the
further loss of party control which would result from a general duty to disclose relevant
material. In short, the situation remains much as it was described in Kaplan, von Mehren &
Schaefer, supra note 1, at 1246-47.
370. See the 1980 amendments to the FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) and 37(g). For a report on
efforts of the American Bar Association's Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and
Delay in the discovery area, see Chapter, Limiting Discovery, 20 JUDGES' J. 20 (1981).

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 6

by the experience of at least some compulsory arbitration plans, in
which it appears that the overall settlement rate declines as processing
time is shortened. 7 ' Certainly, the West German system is especially
well suited to the average dispute, flexible and still relatively inexpensive. As we search for the best way to handle such disputes, we can
profit by further study of their approach.

371. This is the import of data gathered in the Rochester, New York project over 10
years from 1967-1977. See Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, Compulsory Civil Arbitration.' The
Rochester Answer to Court Backlogs, 20 JUDGES' J. 36, 40-41 (1981).

